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Abstract
The limitation of the use of input-validation approach in anomaly detection at the
application layer is that a malicious software like Stuxnet worm can successfully
return looped expected values to a monitoring application while executing the attack.
To overcome these application layer-based anomaly detector limitations, we focus on
anomaly detection at the kernel layer. Anomaly detection using kernel-level traces has
unique advantages in detecting security threats early, but challenges associated with
understanding the patterns for online and offline monitoring are enormous. However,
the problem of the intricate pattern of the kernel-level events can be solved with
effective machine learning approaches but requires a deep understanding of the data
in the application domain.
In this thesis, we design and implement machine learning frameworks based on deep
learning (DL) and clustering that capture the context of a process in both inter-
process and intra-process interactions via kernel-level event profile analysis. Since
the context is learned from the kernel-level events, we provide cybersecurity solutions
without compromising the privacy of the software applications because there is no
one-to-one mapping between the kernel events and the source code of the process.
During operation, we label patterns deviating from the benign context as malicious
and we can kill or restart the process when we detect that it has been compromised.
Software applications have a high degree of reliability. Therefore, data collected from
iii
these applications to create machine learning models is not balanced and introduces
a bias in the machine learning model. We solve this challenge with a novel generative
adversarial network (GAN)-based oversampling technique that inherently removes
noise and outliers from the data without the use of the computationally expensive
strategy of input sample inversion.
We test the proposed frameworks with several publicly available benchmark anomaly
datasets of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), network logs, and images with varying
profiles that impact the order, distribution, and execution time contexts of the ap-
plications. In all the test cases, the results of the frameworks in this thesis show a
3%− 13% improvement in the Precision, Accuracy, and Recall over the benchmark
approaches used for comparison.
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With the arrival of the 5G cellular networks, more devices are now acquiring computing
capacity that can occur in any location and format in what experts refer to as ubiqui-
tous computing (ubicomp). Ubicomp enables more inter-device, inter-module, machine-to-
machine communication and ultimately transforms the way we store, process, and consume
data [37]. As Internet of Everything (IoE) and ubicomp increase our reliance on technol-
ogy in all spheres of our lives, authors of [2] highlight the security concerns inherent in
the adoption of these technologies without thorough examination. These concerns arise
because both experts and non-experts adopt these technologies, thereby presenting more
attack vectors to malicious hackers to attack the computing systems. Hence, the need to
1
come up with systems that are robust in terms of the security of the software while being
ubicomp compliant.
In the year 2010, the world discovered the existence of a computer worm called Stuxnet and
its capabilities in cyber warfare [30]. The Stuxnet worm attack is unprecedented because
it represents the first confirmed case of using a cyber worm to attack a substantial cyber-
physical system like a nuclear plant successfully. Apart from the zero-day vulnerabilities
exploited by the worm, the Stuxnet attack exploited the way we design software. Currently,
two applications or sub-modules in the same operating system (OS) cannot verify the state of
each other before exchanging information. Instead, they rely on Application Programming
Interface (API) to verify the information they receive from peers via input validation. This
design pattern ensures that we uphold the privacy requirements and shield the receiving
application from any threat from the sending application but falls short on guaranteeing
data integrity. Therefore, if a peer that sent the data has been hijacked and forced to
send looped expected values to the receiving application, there is no way of detecting this
type of malicious activity. This kind of scenario allows the malicious software to send a
damaging cascading effect to any software or even humans that make critical decisions with
the assumption that the sending software has not been compromised, and this is the main
problem we intend to solve in this research work.
In this thesis, we have re-imagined application security, taking inspiration from nature, and
using artificial intelligence principles based on clustering and DL. Just as the trunk of a tree
2
is the only gateway through which the branches, fruits, flowers, and leaves get the resources
in the ground, the OS in a computer system manages how each of the applications accesses
the system’s resources and also coordinates the inter and intra-process communications.
Therefore, we focus our research on the nature of the system calls that each application
makes to understand the behavior of the apps1 without compromising the privacy and
inbuilt security of the apps. Because OSs have a system-wide view of the actions of the
apps in the system, observing the state of all the apps amounts to providing system-wide
security. Therefore, the frameworks we propose in this thesis can handle both selected apps
and system-wide anomaly detection tasks.
Furthermore, our analysis of the kernel-level event traces of an OS for anomaly detection
presents both a challenge and an opportunity. The difficulty is that the OS events do not
have a one-to-one correspondence to the source code level events. Also, the randomness
injected by interrupts at this layer makes the application of the state alteration methods
[52, 72] challenging. However, this kernel layer also presents a vista of opportunity because
it is an intermediary between the processes and the device drivers, memory, CPU and other
hardware components of the system. Therefore, it creates an avenue to precisely capture
the context of the apps in the system. Also, unlike an anomaly detector designed for the
application layer where the features available for modeling varies from one application to
the other, this layer affords us the opportunity of using a finite set of features to model the
1Software applications, process, and apps are used interchangeably in this report.
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context of the apps. Consequently, we utilize the tight coupling between the distribution,
order, and the temporal variation in the features of kernel traces of a process and the
operation of the application to develop anomaly detection frameworks capable of online
and offline anomaly detection tasks.
The anomaly frameworks proposed in this thesis provide an extra layer of security that
complements the structured protection offered by the process. The modification of the
kernel while in operation is not trivial; therefore, the traces obtained from it reflects the
actual performance of the system when reverse-engineered. The direct link between the
properties in the kernel traces and the apps behavior as well as the relative security offered
by the kernel motivates the use of the traces in modeling the context of the processes.
Whether in the realm of software or hardware, datasets that represent the state of user
processes are mostly imbalanced. This imbalance is because the reliability requirements of
these apps make the occurrence of an anomaly a rare phenomenon. Hence, most datasets
on anomaly detection have a relatively small percentage that captures the anomaly. Also,
the data collection and processing can corrupt the data and result in some variables of
the data having missing values. Therefore, we also propose a distributed, and augmented
techniques that enable us to scale the models, and process data with missingness2, and
class imbalance.
2The concept of a variable or more having missing values in an observation
4
1.2 Problem Statement
The software design paradigm emphasizes modularization to enhance individual app security
and reduce privacy breaches. Therefore, this design pattern relies on the API to verify and
format the data being exchanged between processes or modules. While the use of API
to perform this kind of verification has become popular and robust, the interacting apps
consume the data being exchanged with the assumption that the corresponding app is not
compromised. For apps in different hosts, this scenario is the only option. But for some
apps in a safety-critical system like an autonomous vehicle that share the same host, relying
on API alone may be dangerous because one app can be hacked and every other app that
depends on the data from the hacked app will be making decisions using compromised data.
Since the apps share the same OS, which manages the inter-process interactions, sub-process
communications or access to the systems resources as seen in Fig. 1.1, this thesis proposes a
solution to this kind of scenario by using the system calls that these apps make to model the
event and temporal profile of the apps for both inter-app and intra-app communications,
and detect deviations from these profiles. This added security from the kernel space ensures
that the system is able to detect deviations from any app and isolate it from other modules,
thereby guaranteeing data integrity during information exchange. Also, software apps for
cyber-physical systems come with high reliability requirements, therefore, the occurrence



















Figure 1.1: Processes, and System Resources managed by an OS
the data we collect to model the contexts of these processes is replete with class imbalance.
Also, data corruption during collection or processing entails that some of the data have
missing values. The class imbalance in data introduces bias and overfitting in supervised
machine learning frameworks. In this regard, we have approached this challenge from three
broad perspectives: a) a closed-world unsupervised learning (clustering and autoencoders)
approach which uses only the normal profile data for modeling. b) a binary class supervised
learning approach (CGAN) which solves the problem of class imbalance, and trains on both
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normal and anomalous classes. c) a distributed anomaly task approach, which solves the
scalability bottleneck resulting from having one anomaly detector per process.
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives
1.3.1 Research Questions
In the design, the traces obtained when the system is adhering to the operational specifica-
tions are called the normal traces. In contrast, those obtained under any other condition
outside the bounds of the specified parameters are malicious traces. As stated in Section
1.2, the number of distinct events in the kernel is finite, and the intersection of event types
in the malicious and typical traces is not empty. Furthermore, we assume that there is a
complete knowledge of the standard performance specifications, but the degree of anomalies
obtainable could be infinite. Hence, we develop closed-world anomaly frameworks using the
features present in the typical traces. We categorize the proposed approaches as clustering
and DL frameworks in terms of the design principles, and as unsupervised and supervised
frameworks in terms of the kind of data it can handle. The extensive types of anomalies
necessitate the use of missing values injection and imputation technique to augment the
anomaly detection framework in the unsupervised scenario. In the supervised setting, we
use conditional generative adversarial network (CGAN) to solve class imbalance, which is
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prevalent in anomaly detection tasks. We postulate that the shared events between the
standard and malicious traces are sufficient to discriminate between the two types of traces
in the unsupervised anomaly detection tasks. Furthermore, the anomaly detectors we pro-
pose in this thesis are unique for each process we monitor. And since we are in the era
of ubicomp, the number of apps with an active anomaly detector can easily overwhelm
the system’s available computing resources. Therefore, we will be proposing a distributed
anomaly task offloading scheme that enables the proposed anomaly detectors to scale in a
networked environment.
Having observed the kernel traces of a process under various operating conditions, we for-
mulate the following research questions:
1. Can we use the unsupervised features of the traces generated under the normal oper-
ating condition to design an anomaly detection framework that is capable of detecting
non-conforming contexts?
2. In case of missingness in unsupervised data, if we augment the framework with some
derived data to cater for the missing contexts, how well does the anomaly detection
framework perform?
3. If labeled data is available but with class imbalance, can we develop an effective
anomaly detection framework that can solve the challenge of class imbalance in data
and still detect malicious contexts?
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4. Since the proposed anomaly detection frameworks are unique for each process, how do
we scale the anomaly detection frameworks to ensure that more apps are monitored
considering that our devices have limited resources?
1.3.2 Research Objectives
The four main objectives of this thesis are:
1. To design an anomaly detection framework based on vector space model (VSM) and
hierarchical clustering for the kernel-level event profile distribution context classifica-
tion of processes.
2. To design an attention-based autoencoder anomaly detection frameworks for the event
and temporal profile deviant context detection in the kernel traces of apps.
3. To design a GAN-derived anomaly detector that solves the problem of class imbalance
in datasets.




This thesis provides four novel anomaly detection approaches that improve the detection of
malicious event and temporal contexts in kernel traces of processes. Also, we propose a new
offloading algorithm that enables the anomaly detectors to scale by enabling distributed
processing of tasks. In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are:
y The design and implementation of an unsupervised anomaly detector using the quan-
titative variance of the features of kernel traces of a process.
y The creation of a deep recursive attentive network for unsupervised malicious context
detection in the event and temporal profiles of apps.
y The design and implementation of a CGAN-based supervised anomaly detector that
eliminates the bias and overfitting caused by class imbalance in data.
y The introduction of a distributed task algorithm that enables the anomaly detectors
to scale and utilize available edge resources.
1.5 Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 describes the research overview as well as the research objectives and proposed
contributions. In Chapter 2, we review the relevant literature in anomaly detection with
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emphasis on statistical and DL approaches. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, we present both the
supervised and unsupervised anomaly detection frameworks that are based on clustering,
and deep, recursive, attentive networks. We also present the offloading scheme for the
anomaly detectors in this chapter. After that, we discuss the experiments we conduct
to validate the various proposed approaches on several benchmark datasets in anomaly
detection in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 analyses the experimental results and compare them with
other algorithms that have tested on the same benchmark datasets. Finally, we conclude





A software designer defines the states of the app or process. The designers create a binary
decision boundary in which they represent the app’s intended actions as either in the normal
state, or in the faults state. However, the authors in [48] state that there is also a grey
area that represents the behaviors that are neither classified as usual nor erroneous/faulty
in the specifications of the process. This grey zone is called the anomalous state. These
three states are shown in Fig. 2.1 and the process can be in any of these behavioral states.
The anomalies can be due to the flaws in the design, device malfunction, sensing equipment
degeneration, an adversary trying to identify a vulnerability to exploit, etc. Therefore,
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anomaly detection models for these software apps or processes aim to recognize the system
states which conform to neither the normal state nor the error/fault state specified in
the process design. If a process has a well-defined range of operation of the different sub-
modules as well as the range of typical values resulting from the interaction of these entities,
then the authors of [62] posit that plausibility checks can be applied to detect anomalies.
However, as shown in [74], this plausibility analyses work best at the application layer traces
where there is an exchange of real values or syntactic data that one can compare with a
priori knowledge. This kind of test is difficult at the kernel layer, hence our preference
for a dynamic anomaly detection framework that can use the operational circumstances to
independently build anomaly frameworks that can keep track of the process contexts to catch




Figure 2.1: Different Operational States of a Process
methods [60, 54, 31, 10]. The signature-based designs have higher accuracy than model-
based schemes because it checks for anomalies with well-known signatures. This static
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nature of the signature-based approaches is its limitation. The model-based methods tend
to address the flaws in signature-based systems by creating a dynamic model that targets
known and novel signatures. However, this broader scope in target usually results in low
accuracy, higher false positives/negatives than the signature-based method. A combination
of these procedures are highlighted in [31, 10]. Since this thesis is an example of the model-
based method, we focus our attention on this approach.
Research in the model-based anomaly detection techniques has focused broadly in two
categories: volume-based and feature-based anomaly detection methods [11]. The volume-
based methods like those of [36, 59, 75] detect aberrations by observing the aggregate traffic
in a network and uses traffic volume variations to detect when an anomaly has occurred in
a network. While this scheme can work well in detecting attacks that result in high traffic
flow changes like network flooding attacks, others that do not lead to total traffic volume
variations may be hard to detect. An example of the volume-based method is the use of
information theory property called entropy in building models. While entropy is a useful
feature because of its ability to model changes that result in convergence or divergence of
a probability distribution, it can wrongly classify attacks. A single value of entropy can
belong to different probability distributions. Hence, its usefulness only gives a non-stable
model of the features. In the feature-based frameworks of [34, 8], they use the features of
the data that represent the context of the process to construct the anomaly framework. A
sub-category of the featured based model is the end-to-end anomaly detection models like
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those of [87, 81] which take the raw data as an input and produce a decision. These end-
to-end frameworks perform autoencoding on the data’s inherent properties and generate an
anomaly decision using subsequent modules of the anomaly framework. A limitation of the
feature-based models for the non-end-to-end frameworks is that they require expertise to
select the optimal features that will produce the targeted performance in anomaly detection.
Although research on feature selection [17, 70] is quite mature as demonstrated by the high
volume of publications in this area, there is no one-size-fits-all approach since the context
of every process is different.
2.2 Statistical Anomaly Frameworks Review
We report related works that do not use artificial neural networks in the design of the
anomaly framework under this statistical anomaly detector categorization. These include
all the statistical methods like clustering, Naive Bays, and their likes. Clustering is the task
of grouping a set of objects represented as points in such a way that points in the same
group (called a cluster) are more similar (in some sense) to each other than to those in
other groups (clusters) [63]. Distance metrics, frequency of neighbors, and other statistical
measures of similarity determine the grouping of a data object. In [4], the authors develop
a cluster-based real-time anomaly detector called streaming sliding window local outlier
factor coreset clustering algorithms (SSWLOFCC) to enable real-time anomaly detection.
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While SSWLOFCC presents a compelling argument on the superiority of its algorithm in
real-time processing, the use of sliding window processing is similar to batch processing
that the authors promised to eliminate. Therefore, SSWLOFCC is not entirely a real-time
anomaly detector. In [22, 27], the authors used kernel events to build an offline anomaly
detection model using VSM concepts and agglomerative clustering technique. Imputation
techniques were also used to increase the scope of their model and reduce the incidents
of false positives. However, the anomaly frameworks of [22, 27] lack temporal modeling.
Hence, they do not capture the nature of the process behavior that emits system calls
in discrete, sequential mode. The authors of [45] propose a hierarchical framework for
detecting local and global anomalies via hierarchical feature representation and Gaussian
process regression (GPR) that is fully nonparametric and robust to the noisy training data
and supports sparse features. To facilitate simultaneous local and global anomaly detection,
the authors formulate the extraction of normal interactions from the training video samples
as a problem of finding the frequent geometric relations of the nearby sparse spatio-temporal
interest points (STIPs). The authors claim to be the first to use GPR to model the nearby
STIPs for anomaly detection, and the results are impressive on the test data. However, the
focus of this anomaly framework is video data only.
In [38], the authors propose a Wireless LAN (IEEE 802.11) protocol intrusion detection
system based on sequential state machine transition of the IEEE 802.11 protocol during its
regular operation. During testing, they flag any deviation from the observed normal state
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machine transitions as anomalous. Since state machine transitions have finite states, they
rebuild the system each time they detect a new normal state, and this makes it difficult to
operate in online or real-time applications. Also, the use of fixed-size n-gram introduces
a hyperparameter that may vary based on prevailing experimental conditions. And the
anomaly detection framework of [38] has a limited scope of the types of wireless attacks
present in the IEEE 802.11 protocol. Furthermore, the authors of [33] introduce a host-
based anomaly intrusion framework that aims to increase true positive rate while reducing
the false positive rate. This anomaly framework builds discontinuous system call patterns
using semantic structure analysis of the kernel-level events. They use the study of the
semantic structure of the system calls to understand the intricate patterns that define the
behavior of the application at the user space layer. One of the fundamental properties of
the anomaly framework of [33] is its portability to different operating systems. Still, the
algorithm relies on memorization over generalization, thereby making it vulnerable to some
mimicry attacks, as demonstrated in [84].
The authors of [66] has an anomaly model built using traces of embedded real-time op-
erating systems and classifies the behavior of real-time systems using inter-arrival curves.
While this model targets the same domain layer as we intend to, the statistical concept of
inter-arrival curves serves as a discriminating factor for capturing the recurrence inherent in
these systems. This procedure varies from our machine learning-based approach. Authors
of [80] used textual information buried in console logs of a program to create an anomaly
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detection model using principal component analysis that analyzes user credentials and ac-
tions. Also, [58] constructed host-based anomaly detection models using Bayesian Networks
that use system call arguments and variables as its features. The model of [58] uses ag-
gregate weighting to reduce the effect of inconsistent anomaly scores from different models.
Still, they do not consider the temporal relationship amongst the sequence of the system
calls. Authors of [84] have an anomaly model built using system call frequency distribu-
tion as well as clustering techniques to detect when processes deviate from their standard
profiles. Similar to the anomaly frameworks of [22, 27], the model of [84] has no temporal
modeling of the events and fit only for post-mortem analysis. Also, [49] used system call
traces without arguments to create an anomalous profile detector using deterministic finite
automaton (DFA). The authors assume that random system call sequences have a local
profile and that with the use of a locality frame, they can detect these anomalies. This local
profile assumption is the limitation of the work as sophistication in cyberattacks shows that
attackers design exploits using both local and non-local profiles of the process. However, the
authors of [49] admitted that when the abnormal sequences do not concentrate in a burst,
their algorithm cannot handle such scenarios. The authors in [76] used techniques such
as the counting of observed system calls, frequency distribution approaches, a rule-based
method called RIPPER, and a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to construct anomaly models
to detect valid and irregular behavioral profiles. Furthermore, in [43], a sliding window ap-
proach is used to construct a tree of the possible routes of the system call sequences based
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on the observed behavior during the learning phase. Again, [76, 43] only consider the event
ordering of the traces and all other parameters like the timing information and system call
arguments are ignored, and these approaches cannot handle a previously unseen system call
event without reconstructing the whole model.
Furthermore, the authors of [83] proposed a hybrid of a hierarchical context-aware anomaly
detection method using unsupervised learning and a multimodal anomaly classification
method that can accurately detect and classify various photovoltaic system anomalies.
While this solves a critical problem in the deployment of solar farms, the authors acknowl-
edged that they ought to capture more features of the solar system to increase the range
of anomalies that the model can detect. In [44], the authors proposed a generalized ap-
proach moving things outlier detection (MTOD) for anomaly detection from the Internet of
Moving Things. The source of data for this MTOD algorithm includes viewable direction
anomalies, gravity anomalies, and magnetic field anomalies. The accelerometer, gyroscope,
the magnetometer, the RPM sensor, etc. can collect these parameters. However, the use of
different settings for each sensor data generates too many parameters for the algorithm, and
this can impact the accuracy of MTOD. Also, the algorithm does not run online or in real-
time, thereby making its deployment difficult since MTOD is supposed to track outliers in
moving things. Authors of [73] introduced a user-centric anomaly detection approach that
uses tensors to store meta-paths in heterogeneous information networks and also uses tensor
decomposition techniques to extract nodal features from a tensor. The tensor decomposi-
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tion method augments with clustering methods that consider various meta-paths each node
has with others as properties of that node, and use the decomposition and clustering tech-
niques to detect anomalies. The results of the experiments of [73] are impressive, but the
algorithm has no version for temporal networks. Furthermore, in [78], the authors propose
a new kernel function, the Volcano kernel, which is more appropriate for estimating the
local densities of samples and then detecting anomalies. The proposed Volcano kernel uses
a weighted neighborhood density estimation to provide a more robust neighborhood size
parameter, reducing the inaccuracy introduced by the neighborhood size parameter in tra-
ditional local density estimators. The Volcano kernel can detect the salient regions missed
by competing algorithms. However, it still requires the tuning of several parameters, which
may reduce the saliency anomaly scores. The authors of [65] propose a hybrid of restricted
Boltzmann machine (RBM) and gradient descent based support vector machine (SVM) to
design an anomaly detection framework for the flow traffic of software-defined networks
with emphasis on social multimedia flow. To reduce overfitting, which is common in RBMs,
the authors incorporated dropouts in the system. Also, to dynamically update the decision
function of the anomaly detector, a gradient descent based SVM is used. However, the
focus on only social media traffic while ignoring other sectors like intelligent transportation
systems, smart grids, smart homes, etc. is a limitation of this anomaly framework.
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Recurrent Neural Networks [56],[40],[20],[64]
Other DL [86]
2.3 Deep Learning Anomaly Detection Frameworks
Review
In [56], the authors built a model based on a stacked long-short-term memory network
to detect an anomaly in time series data using prediction errors. However, as a look-
forward-only network, this model works well when the time series data does not have high
unpredictability. The encoder-decoder model in [55] builds on the ideas espoused by the
authors of [56] to detect an anomaly in multi-sensor time-series data by using the sequence
reconstruction error. This simple encoder-decoder model works well for transfer learning,
but the result degrades fast when the source input is long, as discussed by the authors
of [13]. The decoder of this model relies on a fixed-size context vector to decode the output
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targets. This fixed-size context reduces the ability of the model to interpret, translate, or
reconstruct long sequences. While some of our proposed approaches share some similarities
with [55] in the use of autoencoders, we develop this approach further by designing a
stacked encoder-decoder model with an attention layer. This inclusion of attention layer
increases the fast learning of temporal relationships amongst features in a highly random
time series data. And it also reduces the effect of uncorrelated elements on each other.
The inclusion of the attention layer also solves the fixed-size context inherent in the simple
encoder-decoder architecture of [55]. The authors in [20] used deep long short-term memory
(LSTM) [42] models constructed from system logs to create anomaly detection models for
detecting anomalies in logs from virtual machines. The LSTM model augments with a
workflow model that helps to detect context switches. Still, since it is a host-based anomaly
framework, it lacks the fine granularity of process-based anomaly detection frameworks. In
[23, 25], a hybrid of the hierarchical LSTM network with attention and the KNN clustering
are used to model the contexts of processes using kernel trace analysis. This hybrid approach
solves the problem of fixed-size context vectors of [55]. Still, the features which ordinarily
should yield a more representative model like timestamps, CPU cycles, and system call
arguments are skipped, thereby producing an anomaly framework that models the event
profile but lacks temporal context. Furthermore, [1] builds an anomaly detection framework
for detecting malicious attacks in IoT devices with a focus on DoS (Denial of Services), DDoS
(Distributed Denial of Services), R2L (Remote 2 Local), U2R (User to Root), and probe
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attack. A weakness of the anomaly framework of [1] is the limitation of the target scopes
to only four attack types. Therefore, the presence of other intrusion types in the network
cannot be detected using this framework. In [64], the authors propose an anomaly detection
framework for an intelligent transportation system called nLSALog, which parses raw logs
to produce a feature template which they feed to a stacked LSTM layers with self-attention
to create the next feature in the log template. Since this anomaly framework uses a word
embedding framework to parse the raw logs, it uses VSM in conjunction with LSTM with
attention. Despite the effectiveness of the nLSALog, the framework cannot locate the exact
location of an anomaly in the sequence and cannot provide insight into the cause of the
defect.
In [51], the authors implemented a generic GAN called MAD-GAN to do anomaly detection
in multivariate data by using the linear combination of the residual errors of the generator
and discriminator to create an anomaly threshold. This work’s method relates to some of
our approaches in terms of creating an anomaly framework derived from GAN but differs
greatly in design and implementation. MADGAN uses the generic GAN architecture, but
we have a CGAN architecture conditioned by an input sequence to create a classification
model that evolves with the context of the application or process. MAD-GAN also differs
from our CGAN approach in terms of making anomaly decision. It uses both the generator
and discriminator for both training and inference while we require only the generator during
inference. Also, instead of using residual errors of the GANs for anomaly decision as done
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in [51], we came up with a cluster-based anomaly detector. Another key difference is the
requirement in MAD-GAN to invert the input samples to the latent space during inference
which makes the computation expensive. The authors of [69] propose a deep convolutional
GAN named AnoGAN that learns the normal anatomical variability based on mapping
from image space to latent space and uses this knowledge to discriminate between benign
and anomalous medical image samples. AnoGAN is designed for unsupervised learning, and
as such, it trains only on the normal profile sample during the training phase. Therefore,
even though it is designed for unsupervised learning, it still relies on human intervention
to accurately identify the standard samples used for training, which can be a source of
error. Further on GAN-based approaches, [85] proposes an anomaly detection framework
with GAN called EGAN which uses an extra module called an encoder to learn the input to
latent space mapping during training to avoid the computationally intensive process of input
sample inversion during inference. While the use of an encoder is smart, this framework is
still complicated and makes it difficult for online application since all the modules are used
during inference. Furthermore, the authors of [39] employ transfer learning to train a deep
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) called DACNN for diagnosing mechanical faults. The
generative adversarial network learning is used as a regularization scheme during training
to enable DACNN to overcome the limitation of insufficient labeled data that plague many
supervised algorithms. Thereby resulting in improved generalization performance on the
test data during inference.
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Also, in [24, 26], the authors implemented an ensemble framework based on autoencoders
with the attention layer to do anomaly detection in both the event and temporal stream of
the system call properties. The anomaly frameworks of [24, 26] incorporate the temporal
information analysis, which is lacking in many other works. Still, the predictions could
suffer from cumulative errors caused by when an anomalous sub-sequence in the input. In
[29], the authors employ a two-stream network framework of Gaussian Mixture Variational
Autoencoders based on DL to design an anomaly detector for video frames. Based on
each of the Gaussian mixture components’ joint probabilities, they use a sample energy-
based method to score the anomaly of image test patches. While the proposed approach
in [29] generates an excellent result, the use of two-stream variational autoencoders makes
the network complex and impracticable for online application. The authors of [53] use
DL-based autoencoders to perform one-class classification and anomaly detection of stress
echocardiograms using unsupervised DL techniques to discriminate between normal and
abnormal videos as well as to localize wall motion abnormalities within individual frames.
The use of data from only 36 patients to serve as ground truths is not representative enough
for a DL network. Therefore, further tests with more data are needed to corroborate the
results reported in [53]. In [40], the authors propose an anomaly detection framework
for monitoring lane abnormality. This proposed anomaly framework uses CGAN for data
augmentation of the anomalous minority class to enable the recurrent anomaly framework
to train on balanced data. The CGAN is composed of LSTM networks, while the anomaly
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detector is implemented using gated recurrent units to reduce latency. Since the quality
of the auxiliary data generated during the data augmentation stage is dependent on the
distribution of the actual few data samples, the authors would have conducted an experiment
to highlight the effect of the distribution of the few data samples on the generated augmented
samples. The anomaly detection framework of [50] uses convolutional neural networks
and mixed Gaussian models to detect anomalies in the x-ray security images. The target
anomalies are appearance and semantic anomalies in the contents of bags subjected to x-
ray screening. While this anomaly detector performed well on the test dataset, a major
limitation of this proposition is that the test and training samples are camera photo images
and not x-ray images, which is the target application. Therefore, the results returned with
this anomaly detector on these camera images are to be consumed with cautious optimism.
In Table 2.1, we present the techniques used by some of the research discussed in Chapter
2 to highlight the shift in technical approaches over the years. A X indicates the use
of this technique in the referenced work. Analytical methods like clustering and entropy
are grouped into the statistical column of Table 2.1. Other machine learning classifiers
like Naive Bayes, which do not fall under the given categories, are also grouped into the
statistical column. While almost all the works have some elements of statistics in the design,




In this chapter, we presented relevant works in anomaly detection research that focuses
on different aspects of data. In particular, anomaly detection frameworks in kernel-level
events, video, images, and texts are explored. First, we explored the broad view of anomaly
detection that deals with the definition and categorization. Then, we discussed the related
works in the two approaches that apply to this thesis report: statistical/clustering and DL






Process IDs, timestamps, events, and process names are some of the properties of the kernel-
level traces, and we derive the features of these anomaly frameworks by selecting some of
the properties of the traces. We process the features with text processing concepts like
VSM. Also, while an application error study is concerned with error occasioned by faults
like wrong or illegal code sequence execution [52, 16, 57, 18, 61], these anomaly frameworks
target both legitimate and illegitimate code execution that results in an irregularity in the
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desired performance of the user-process of interest. An example is the Stuxnet worm attack
[30] in which a centrifuge was hijacked, and the operators could not detect that something
was wrong. In this case, the software and the underlying OS have valid code executions, but
the hardware controlled by the OS is running out of bounds. We state the problem as thus:
Using the features in the system calls of process traces obtained when a well-specified process
is operating according to its defined conditions, can we build anomaly detection frameworks
to detect an aberration in the behavior of the software application via the kernel-level event
feature analysis?
To solve the problem posed above, we propose several anomaly detection approaches from
Section 3.3 through Section 3.6. Each succeeding anomaly framework incrementally builds
on the preceding framework to rectify the limitations identified in the other framework.
Section 3.3 is based on statistical analysis of the kernel-level event distributions of a user
process and makes anomaly decision using dendrogrammatic distances while the anomaly
detection frameworks of Section 3.4 through Section 3.6 are based on DL. Specifically,
Section 3.4 introduces anomaly detection using autoencoders with an attention layer to
capture the order of the events. This sequential semantic analysis uses small input sub-
samples and brings online anomaly detection capability to our approaches. In Section 3.5,
we discuss the ensemble architecture based on autoencoders too that solves the limitations
of the framework of Section 3.4 concerning simultaneous anomaly detection in the frequency,
order and execution times of the events of a process. Then, in Section 3.6, we introduce
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our last DL-based anomaly detector that solves the class imbalance challenge in anomaly
detection. Finally, we introduce a novel distributed algorithm in Section 3.7 that facilitates
the deployment of these anomaly detection frameworks in edge devices.
3.2 Online versus Offline Anomaly Frameworks
Anomaly detection frameworks come in two major operating conditions:
y Online or near-real-time: In this thesis, the use of the word online refers to the
version of the anomaly detection framework in which the inference time latency is
short. Any anomaly score decision we return after the latency constraint has elapsed
becomes stale. The driving factor for the inference time, in our definition, is the design
and implementation architecture of the anomaly detection framework and does not
depend on the availability of computing resources. In all of our experiments, we
classify latency constraints in the milliseconds’ range as an online anomaly detection
requirement.
y Offline: On the contrary, we classify the anomaly detection frameworks suitable
for post-mortem analysis because of the design as offline anomaly models. These
anomaly frameworks produce fine or coarse decisions of the state of the process, but
there is no latency constraint. These kinds of anomaly frameworks are deployed to
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mine for the presence of an anomaly or otherwise on stored data and not on data
from an active process.
3.3 Anomaly Detection Framework using Event
Distribution Analysis and Clustering
3.3.1 Strengths and Limitations
Kernel-level events are a finite set of routines which are invoked by tasks scheduled by the
OS. The order and type of events vary based on the type and function of the process. The
table in Fig. 3.1 shows a snapshot of the kernel-level events from QNX RTOS with some of
the attributes(timestamps, class, events, process name) shown. The events are sequential,
and there is a temporal and local relationship that exists amongst the events within a
snapshot. In Fig. 3.1, the REC_PULSE event in row 7 has a cause and effect relationship
with SND_PULSE_EXE event of row 2. Some sequential-based machine learning models can
efficiently learn these temporal relationships, but it will require a very long sequence as an
input. However, if a malicious intruder code execution generates sequences with a similar
order used in building the profile as explained in Section 3.3.3, the sequence-based scheme
will fail to detect the anomaly.
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Strengths
1. An error or attack in the process be captured by anomaly framework if the actions
of the error or attack leaves a previously seen kernel-level event footprint.
2. Generation of a mixture of known and previously unseen events will be captured since
it uses distribution to discriminate between normal and deviant behavior.
Limitations
1. This anomaly framework does not consider the ordering of the events nor does it con-
sider clock-signal manipulation related errors/attacks. Therefore, it is not designed
to detect errors/attacks aimed at manipulating the ordering of events or tampering
with the temporal information.
2. Also, this framework is not suitable for detecting snappy errors/attacks as the effect
on the decision may not be significant.
The DL-based anomaly frameworks of Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 will address these limi-
tations.
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Figure 3.1: Sample Kernel-level Events Trace of QNX Neutrino RTOS
3.3.2 Definitions and Assumptions
Definitions
We provide the definitions of some of the terms we will often mention in Section 3.3 to aid
the understanding of this anomaly framework.
y A feature refers to a unique variable resulting from the union of the class1 and the
event attributes of the traces.
y class∪ event as a feature is considered significant for this modeling because it mirrors
1In QNX Neutrino RTOS, kernel events are grouped into classes, and that is why a class is part
of the attribute of the traces.
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the context of the process generating the kernel-level events.
y An anomaly refers to a deviation from the specified behavior of the software appli-
cation. This departure from the expected action can be as a result of deliberate or
involuntary action of the application, and the kernel-level events collected during this
fault/error is called an anomalous trace.
Assumptions
The following assumptions are made in designing this anomaly framework.
a) We assume that the software application is well defined and that the execution sce-
narios can be exhausted during training. Because of the repetitive nature of software
applications, the corresponding kernel-level events create a pseudo-stationary distri-
bution which makes this assumption feasible in most applications.
b) We also assume that an error or insertion of malicious code will not result in null events
at the kernel level. i.e., execution of malicious codes/errors should create events in
the kernel layer. This is a necessary condition because if the malicious code/error
does not generate kernel-level events, then this anomaly framework cannot detect the
anomaly.
c) The location of the data collected for training is assumed secure, and the tasks that
generate the events are considered to adhere to the normal operational profile.
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3.3.3 Target Anomalous Scenarios
In formulating the threat model of this anomaly framework, Fig. 3.2 is used for our il-
lustration. In Fig. 3.2, the blocks start_rotors(), set_cordinate(), fly() and
deliver_load() depict one sequence of normal operational profile scenario of a UAV used
for delivery of goods. The kernel-level events resulting from the execution of start_rotors()
−→ set_cordinate() −→ fly() −→ deliver_load() marks one complete normal oper-
ational cycle logs. Now, if there is an insertion of a malicious code modify_cordinate()
into the sequence of the execution as depicted in Fig. 3.2, one of three possibilities will
occur in terms of how the malicious code affects the overall profile of the kernel-level events
when the tasks complete one cycle of execution. The outcomes are illustrated in Fig. 3.2
and explained next:
a) No Events: the modify_cordinate() stealthily changes the destination coordinates
without generating any kernel events. This anomaly framework cannot detect this
anomaly.
b) Duplicate Events Only : if start_rotors() and fly() generate the same kernel-
level event sequences, the modify_cordinate() can manipulate the destination co-
ordinates and cleverly generate the same sequences used by the adjoining tasks as
demonstrated in [84]. We can detect this anomaly using this framework since it uses
the statistical variation of the observed features.
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c) Mix of Events: if modify_cordinate() creates kernel-level events sequences that are
a mix of known and unknown types with any order, this anomaly framework can
detect this type of anomaly because the generation of unknown events affects the







Figure 3.2: Target Anomaly Scenarios for the Cluster-Based Anomaly Framework
Finally, our threat model does not account for how the malicious code of Fig. 3.2 got injected
in the application.
3.3.4 Feature Extraction and Processing
The kernel traces have many attributes, and the rendering varies from one platform to the
other. However, some of the attributes are either not generic enough or contain lots of null
values. Therefore, our feature extraction module reduces bias in the model by focusing on
attributes that are common in kernel traces across platforms. The events (class ∪ events in
QNX) stand out as our choice in the feature space. In Algorithm 1, we outline the process
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input : Trace: TM×N
output: Features : ~F M
1 M is the number of samples in T ;
2 N is the attribute size of T ;
3 ~F ←− [ ];
4 for m ∈M do
5 classm ←− T [m].class;
6 eventm ←− T [m].event;
7 fm ←− classm ∪ eventm;
8 ~F ←− ~F ∪ fm;
9 end
10 return ~F ;
Algorithm 1: Feature Extraction Procedure from a Kernel-level Trace
of extracting a feature for any raw trace received by the algorithm. Next, we construct
a distribution matrix of the features per batch of traces. A batch of traces represents
the fixed time logging of kernel-level traces of a complete sequence of a process execution
as illustrated in Fig. 3.2. We explain the steps of constructing this feature vector under
Definition 3.1.
Definition 3.1. Algorithm 1 returns feature vectors (~F ) for each batch of the trace it
processes. The ~F s are the inputs to the feature space distribution module, and the steps
are as thus: when we see a unique feature for the first time in trace ~F , we create a value-
count pair with the count initialized to 1. An occurrence of an already seen feature in
the same ~F increments the corresponding count. If we have a ~F = {f1, f2, f3, ..., fn} in
which n = |~F | is the cardinality of the features in ~F , fi = features ∀ i = {1,2,3, ..., n},
v refers to each unique feature f observed in ~F while fv, ~F is the number of fv present
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Figure 3.3: Schematic Diagram of the Cluster-Based Anomaly Detection Framework
in ~F for each unique v. We repeat this process for all ~F in a given experiment with all
the unique features forming our feature space for each scenario and we construct a feature
space distribution matrix where the rows represent the different ~F and the column is the
set of features V ⊃ v we extract from the different ~F inputs. Because the traces can
be of different lengths depending on the logging situation or behavior of the application,
we normalize the features obtained in each ~F to remove the bias associated with unequal
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length ~F . We use (3.1) to compute the feature frequency of each v in ~F . Since our goal
is detecting anomalies in a system in which anomalies are a rarity, it becomes important
that we also tackle the bias introduced by the pseudo-stationary nature of the time-series
system call events. The pseudo-stationary nature makes it very easy for some events from
the kernel to dominate other events and mask the effect of rare events which could provide
us with the salient information that enhances the discovery of similarities amongst traces
and detection of anomalous behavior. Therefore, while (3.1) computes the importance
of a v in a ~F , we also handle the effect of a given v in all the traces in the corpus J .
This ensures that frequently occurring events that provide less relevant information to
computing the similarity between traces is de-emphasized in favor of rare but impactful
events like anomalous events. This effect of each unique feature based on the number of
traces it occurred in is given mathematically in (3.2). And the product of (3.1) and (3.2)
gives the overall effect of each feature in the trace with less bias. This tf(i, J)× ff(i, ~F )
represents our normalization procedure of the feature vectors in each trace ~F in the corpus
J . This normalized feature space matrix is sent to the feature dimension reduction module
of Section 3.3.5.




tf(v, J) = log
|J |
1 + |f ∈ ~F : v ∈ f |
(3.2)
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Figure 3.4: Feature Distribution Matrix of ~F Showing value-count tuple of ~Fk
.
Example 3.1. Let us assume that a particular feature vector ~F contains the following
features THREAD_THREPLY, COMM_SEND_PULSE_EXE, THREAD_THREADY, COMM_REPLY_MESSAGE,
THREAD_THRUNNING, COMM_REC_PULSE, THREAD_THRECEIVE, COMM_REPLY_MESSAGE in Fig 3.1.
Then, we say that the batch of traces extracted from ~F has the following THREAD_THREPLY,
COMM_SEND_PULSE_EXE, THREAD_THREADY, COMM_REPLY_MESSAGE, THREAD_THRUNNING,
COMM_REC_PULSE, THREAD_THRECEIVE unique features v. Value-count tuple for this ~F cor-
responds to the table shown in Fig. 3.4 and ... indicates that ~F s from other traces can still
contribute other features not seen in ~Fk.
Our anomaly framework uses the statistical variance of the features in the traces; hence the
construction of the feature space distribution matrix. We hypothesize that this modeling
approach works because it shares the following similarities with natural language processing
tasks:
y The features of interest are tuples just like words in documents.
y The order of events determines the behavior of the process just like the order of words
gives syntactic or semantic meaning to a sentence.
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y The vector space model mining is used for purposes of sentiment analysis, text classi-
fication/categorization without recourse to the order in which the words appear and
the results are good enough to adopt a related scheme for anomaly detection using
the derived features as the vocabulary.
Meanwhile, stemming is not used to connect different words to their root because every
class and event is just a unique and arbitrary name without ties to any language in par-
ticular. However, the semi-structured nature of the occurrence of the events as well as the
consequences of the generation of an event mirrors the syntax and semantics of the soft-
ware application driving the kernel event generation. Hence, the need to process events like
tokens in a language.
3.3.5 Feature Dimensionality Reduction
Having constructed the feature space distribution matrix, we consider features which do
not add improvement to the overall performance of the system and filter them out. An
example of such features is those with zero variance, i.e., a fixed number of events in all
feature vectors. These are mostly kernel events used to manage the state of the OS like clock
signals and are not impacted by kernel events generated by the process. In this anomaly
framework, interrupts and clock signals produced events with little or no variance from
trace-to-trace. Therefore, we filter out the zero-variance features and apply dimensionality
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reduction using principal component analysis.
3.3.6 Types of Missingness
The three broad categories of missingness are:
y Missing completely at random (MCAR): If a particular variable, Z has some missing
values, then the MCAR assumption is used if the probability of missingness occurring
in Z is independent of the observed values of Z or observed values of all the other
variables X in the data. However, according to [71, 3], the chance of a relation-
ship existing between missing values in a variable Y and missing values in all other
variables X may exist.
y Missing at random (MAR): This is similar to the definition of MCAR, but the major
difference is that missingness on variable Z is conditional on the values of other
variables X in the data but independent of the value of the variable Z itself. This
conditional probability makes the verification of MAR assumption difficult because
the prior information may also be missing.
y Not missing at random (NMAR): This assumption of missingness is satisfied when
the missing values of a particular variable are dependent on the observed values of
the variable of interest [71].
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3.3.7 Injection and Handling of Missing Values
Many types of missingness can occur during data collection as reported by [19, 71, 3] and
there are broad approaches detailed in [3, 71] for handling the missingness. Our anomaly
framework uses MCAR injection in Section 3.3.7, and we handle the missingness in Section
3.3.7 using overall mean imputation method.
MCAR Missingness Injection
We inject artificial missingness in both our training and validation data to test the limit of
our model in case missing values occur during data collection, and to increase the scope of
anomalies that the framework will be able to detect. We implement the MCAR injection as
it produces unbiased results when treated with overall mean imputation method [19], and
because the assumptions are verifiable [71]. Therefore, the injection step involves iterating
through variable values and replacing each variable value with a NULL value if the outcome
of a sampling drawn from a uniform distribution is satisfied for a particular variable value
under consideration. In this anomaly framework, a variable count is replaced with a NULL
value if an outcome sampled from [0,1] is less than or equal to a specified cut-off value x,
where x is the percentage of data points with missing values. x ranges between 0 and 1.
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Imputation
We use the overall single mean imputation method to handle the missing values in our data.
This process involves taking the average of the remaining values in any variable with missing
information and replacing the missing values with this average. Our assumption is that these
values come from the same distribution and that based on the MCAR assumption used to
inject the missing values, the mean provides a good result when subjected to analysis.
3.3.8 Distance/Similarity Computation
Given the feature space distribution matrix of Fig. 3.4, each row represents a multi-variate
measurement which turns to a point in space. The similarity of points (traces) in the
multi-dimensional domain is determined by observing the distance between points logged
under the same condition. The reduced output of Section 3.3.5 is a multi-variate linearly
independent column vectors in which each row represents one test point (trace). To measure
similarity between two row vectors, we use the Mahalanobis distance metric because: a) it
can handle the computation of the similarity of a test sample from the centroid when
the sample points that form the center of mass are not distributed spherically from the
centroid. This means that using x−µ
σ
in normal distribution to compute the distance of
the test sample from the centroid which is used by Euclidean and Manhattan distance
metrics are augmented by the covariance matrix to ensure that distributions of different
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shapes are handled. b) in addition to providing the distance of the test sample x from the
centroid, the mahalanobis distance metric also considers the distribution of the samples
in the direction of the test sample by using the covariance matrix to scale the distance
computation. Therefore, during training, we use (3.3) to cluster the different vectors or
traces (~x, ~y) from the training samples of the same distribution to build the centroid for
each scenario. During testing, we employ (3.4) to check the similarity or otherwise of the




(~x− ~y)TC−1(~x− ~y) (3.3)
DM(~x) =
√
(~x− ~µ)TC−1(~x− ~µ) (3.4)
3.3.9 Clustering
Clustering and Classification are two candidate approaches for detecting the anomalous
trace. The Mahanalobis distance discussed in Section 3.3.8 can be used for classification
by obtaining the value of the center of mass of the training samples, and applying (3.4) to
compute the distance of the point from the mean of the distribution. However, this method
requires deciding what value of the distance is close enough for the point to be labeled a
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normal trace. This decision requires some form of tuning and extensive knowledge of the
shape of the distribution of the underlying data. Therefore, we consider clustering as a
better approach for detecting the anomalous trace in our situation. Therefore, we discuss
hierarchical clustering algorithm which we used for the anomaly decision. Hierarchical
clustering can be agglomerative or divisive (DIANA) [46] and can produce the same result
at the end of the passes depending on the linkage method employed. However, divisive
clustering requires heuristics at the beginning of the clustering while agglomerative does
not need heuristics as it starts with the minimum distance and proceed from that until the
full dendrogram is built. Hence, our choice of agglomerative clustering technique for building
the dendrogram. Hierarchical clustering also offers the advantage of allowing any distance
metric to be used in computing the distance matrix. Finally, since our context modeling
is not a supervised learning, the hierarchical clustering presents us the best choice since
we generate the dendrogram without relying on an expressively labeled data. The distance
matrix generated from Section 3.3.8 requires a linkage mechanism of which few options are
available like the single-linkage, complete-linkage, average-linkage [35], etc., each with its
own merits and demerits.
max{d(x, y) : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y} (3.5)
The complete-linkage method of (3.5) uses the maximum distance between elements of
clusters X and Y while the single-linkage of (3.6) employs the minimum distance between
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cluster elements in merging clusters. The complete and single linkage methods can produce
deterministic dendrograms or otherwise depending on how ties are broken. If a random
choice is made when there is a tie, different dendrograms can be generated on the same
sample of data on multiple runs. However, if tie are merged at the same time, then a
unique dendrogram can be generated on different runs.
min{d(x, y) : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y} (3.6)
Because of the reasons adduced above, we implement the average-linkage technique of (3.7)
since it uses the average distance of the elements of a cluster instead of maximum or min-









To ensure that we have optimal outcome in the clustering process, we use the cophenetic
correlation coefficient to measure the efficiency of the distance metric and linkage method by
comparing the distance computed by the dendrogram to that of the real distances between
the data points. Given two matrices X and T that contain the real data points, and the
data points constructed by the dendrogram respectively. If x (i, j) represents the distance
between data points i and j using the distance metric discussed in Section 3.3.8 in the
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real data, and t (i, j) is the interval computed by the dendrogram between a corresponding
pair of observation, the cophenetic correlation coefficient of (3.8) measures the relationship
between x (i, j) and t (i, j). Also, unlike the centroid-based clustering algorithms used
in [84], hierarchical clustering does not use centroids as a center of mass and is therefore
immune to data class imbalance. Therefore, tuning the number of clusters and ensuring
class balance in the data are eliminated with the use of hierarchical clustering.
c =
∑
i<j (x (i, j)− x̄) (t (i, j)− t̄)√∑
i<j (x (i, j)− x̄)
2∑




This anomaly framework makes anomaly decision by producing a cut-off value that distin-
guishes the traces. We assume that the statistical variation in the kernel event attributes
is enough to create dendrogram distances that reflect the category or cluster of the traces.
The scipy dendrogram python package has two ways of determining the cut-off distance.
For samples that are not too large, the visualization tool can be employed. However, for
large samples, the API of the dendrogram is leveraged for automatic cut-off distance deter-
mination. We use both approaches in this framework design.
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3.3.11 Limitations
The major limitations of this anomaly framework are: a) it cannot perform online or
real-time anomaly detection because it requires a huge batch of traces as input. b) also,
this anomaly framework cannot capture the temporal relationship since we do not consider
the order of the kernel-level events of a process. Therefore, we will be addressing these
limitations in the DL-based anomaly frameworks that we discuss in Section 3.4 through
Section 3.5.
3.4 Deep Recursive Attentive Anomaly Detection
Framework
Context modeling involves the use of abstractions like Kripke structures and computa-
tional tree logic (CTL)* [7, 15] to describe the process/application behavior by creating
state-transition graphs to verify the behavior of the process. This model checking and ver-
ification schemes rely on different layers of abstraction and that implies that the depth of
the model action that can be synthesized correlates with the level of model abstraction.
However, because the symbolic model behavior verification like CTL* requires that there
exists a finite number of states, deep and broad level of abstraction may result in state
explosion problems. Hence, the resort to Kripke structures that have finite and manageable
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states to represent model behavior. Therefore, for complex processes, this approach does
not return a fine-grained behavioral model and does not capture in-depth execution time
interactions amongst the processes, the hardware, and the kernel. However, the salient
difference between the anomaly frameworks we are introducing in this chapter and the
symbolic model checking schemes is that the former uses non-binary probabilities to cre-
ate the state relationships while the latter utilizes boolean probabilities in capturing the
state interactions. The implication of the use of non-binary probabilities is that a previ-
ously unseen state can be handled without resort to generating an entirely new model as
is obtainable with the use of boolean probabilities. An example system call sequence like
open −→ getrlimit −→ mmap =⇒ close using symbolic model checking methods assumes
that the open, getrlimit, mmap have boolean values of 1 and that they all contributed
equally to the output state close. Meanwhile, owing to the semi-structured nature of the
kernel-level events occasioned by the presence of interrupts at the kernel layer, this open,
getrlimit, mmap may not have had equal impact in the emergence of close as the next
state. For example, in Table 3.1, with binary probabilities the previous states open, getr-
limit, mmap in a linear combination produces the same output irrespective of the order of
the system calls in rows 1 and 2 of the table. Therefore, assuming that Φ is a transfor-
mative function in (3.9) and yi is the encoded system call at state i, the use of boolean
probabilities cannot distinguish between the previous states in rows 1 and 2 of Table 3.1.
However, with non-binary probabilities, the linear combinations will result in different out-
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put values which emphasizes the weight of the order of the previous states in forecasting
the next state. Furthermore, using system call sequences as an example, it implies that all
the possible states (system calls) of an application or a process must be seen before a model
is created using the symbolic model checking schemes but with our anomaly frameworks in
this chapter, this is not required.
yt = Φ (a× yt−1 + b× yt−2 + c× yt−3) (3.9)
Also, some process executions are time-constrained (discrete events have a maximum exe-
cution time during the general modeling process), and it becomes difficult to model these
constraints via abstraction only as some of the factors that affect timeliness or currency are
execution dependent. In most instances of clock glitches attack [5], source code in the ap-
plication layer abstraction is not sufficient to capture such an anomalous injection because
of the many machine-to-machine interactions involved at the kernel layer.
With the increasing integration of machine learning and deep learning frameworks into so
many areas of computing and business intelligence, we design these anomaly frameworks
with deep learning because deep learning offers the following advantages over the traditional
algorithms [9]: a) they perform better when the data is large, and because we are in the big
data age, deep learning networks seem appropriate for anomaly detection especially in the
online deviant behavior detection; b) there is no need for feature engineering by domain
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experts since the cascade of layers in the deep learning frameworks does automatic feature
processing, thereby providing an end-to-end model that takes raw data and returns a deci-
sion; c) deep learning models have also outperformed traditional algorithms in processing
sequential and image data.
3.4.1 Time-Driven vs Event-Driven Execution
We can generate system calls via the regularly scheduled tasks which are as a consequence
of events from a given process, and sometimes, these system calls occur as a result of
interrupts which are event-driven. Moreover, when it is event-driven, fast and slow profiles
can be observed making it difficult to use one of the known types of distribution to model
the behavior of the process. Also, for a real-time process, the constraint on response and
execution time can best be modeled by observing the timestamp property of the system call
and making use of it in creating the model. The fact that some processes may be time-driven,
event-driven or a mixture of both makes a one-size-fits-all solution difficult and complicates
the use of system call information for profile construction. Hence, in this chapter, we
introduce an anomaly framework for event-based processes that uses the LSTM variant
of recurrent neural networks (RNN) for event prediction and k-nearest neighbors (KNN)
algorithm for anomaly classification. This anomaly framework only captures the contexts
that affect the order of the kernel-level events of the traces. Furthermore, we introduce an
ensemble event-driven and time-driven processes anomaly detector that improves the former
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Table 3.1: Showing the Import of Non-binary Probabilities
Previous States Next State
1 a×open b×getrlimit c×mmap ×close
2 a×open b×mmap c×getrlimit ×close
anomaly framework by jointly modeling the time-triggered and event-triggered contexts of a
process through the consideration of the frequency, order and timestamp information of the
traces in learning the behavior of the process or application. To handle the data imbalance
prevalent in the data used for anomaly modeling, we conclude our anomaly framework
modeling with a CGAN-based transfer learning framework for anomaly detection for both
balanced and non-balanced data. Finally, we conclude the chapter with the introduction
of an algorithm to distribute the anomaly tasks amongst many edge devices to speed up
processing of tasks.
3.4.2 Target Anomalous Scenarios
Fig. 3.5 is used for our illustration of the anomalous scenarios we target with this anomaly
detection framework. In Fig. 3.5, the blocks Takeoff, Cruising, Landing and Landed depict
a complete execution flow of the normal operational profile scenario of a UAV application
used for delivery of goods. The kernel-level events resulting from the execution of Takeoff
−→ Cruising −→ Landing −→ Landed marks one complete normal operational cycle logs.
Now, if there is an insertion of a Malicious code2 into the sequence of the execution as
2which aims to divert the goods being transported by modifying the delivery coordinates.
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depicted in Fig. 3.5, one of four possibilities will occur in terms of how the malicious code
affects the overall profile of the kernel events when the tasks complete one cycle of execution.
The outcomes are illustrated in Fig. 3.5 and explained next:
a) No Syscall Events: the Malicious code stealthily changes the destination coordinates
without generating any kernel events. This anomaly framework does not target this
type of anomaly.
b) Seen Syscall (same order): if Takeoff and Cruising generate the same type of kernel-
level event sequences using the same order, the Malicious code can manipulate the
destination coordinates and cleverly yield the same kernel-level event sequences in
the same order used by the adjoining tasks as demonstrated in [84]. This scenarios is
the limitation of this anomaly framework.
c) Seen Syscall (different order): if Malicious code creates kernel events sequence that
is made up of already known event types but with a markedly different order from
the learned profile, this anomaly framework can detect this type of anomaly.
d) Seen/Unseen Syscall : finally, if Malicious code generates kernel events that consists
of known and unknown event types, this anomaly framework is capable of detecting
such an anomaly.
Comparing Fig. 3.5 and the target scenarios of Section 3.4.2 with Fig. 3.2 and the target
scenarios of Section 3.3.3, we can see that the limitation of the anomaly framework of
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Section 3.4 is the strength of the anomaly framework of Section 3.3 and vice versa. The










Figure 3.5: Target Anomaly Scenarios for the Deep Recursive Attentive Framework
diagram of Fig. 3.6 shows the end-to-end design from the raw kernel trace processing to
anomaly decision.
3.4.3 Raw Trace Processing
Similar to the anomaly detection framework of Section 3.3, we use Algorithm 1 to filter
out unwanted attributes of the raw kernel trace events and return our features of interests
which are the kernel events of the process we are monitoring.
3.4.4 Merge Layer
Our hypothesis is based on creating a deep execution context via a recursive input from
the attention layer. Since the attention layer has a learned weight, it means that its output
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Figure 3.6: Architecture of the Deep Recursive Attentive Anomaly Framework
and feeding it along with the present input either reinforces a standard profile or weakens
the prediction accuracy which will indicate the presence of an anomaly. Therefore, (3.10)
describes our approach of merging the recursive input Ci with the present input Xi.
v = merge( ~Xi, ~Ci) (3.10)
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Finally, we reverse the source sequence to create short-term dependencies in the learning
process.
3.4.5 Encoder Layer
Our choice of LSTM cells in this layer stems from the fact that it is designed primarily
for sequential data and its recursive nature helps to propagate temporal information across
so many timesteps infinitely in theory. However, we recognize that in practice, there is a
limit to how far behind it can propagate the errors before the vanishing gradient problem
discussed in [79] sets in. Hence, our idea to augment it with a recursive context to improve
the learnability over a long span of time. We feed the merge layer vector ~v ∈ Rn to the
encoder layer. Different kinds of LSTM configuration can be used, but we use the vanilla
variant described in [42] to create our encoder and decoder layers. This layer’s output is
described mathematically in (3.11) where Φ is a nonlinear function representing the LSTM
cell, and b is the bias vector.














Figure 3.7: Context-aware Attention Network for the Anomaly Detection Framework
3.4.6 Attention Layer
Attention layers come in broadly two flavors: soft and hard attention. The soft-attention
uses weighted outputs of the input to attend while hard-attention randomly selects a subset
of the input to attend. Each has its advantage and disadvantages, but we focus on the
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soft-attention method in this work. We sacrifice the efficiency of computation by using the
weighted sum of all source inputs, as this helps the model to learn efficiently using back-
propagation with gradient descent during training. Differing from [68] that uses memory to
create context, we design a query weight Wq that is learned during training to ensure that
each tuple is not attended to by just its occurrence in the present input sequence only but
also based on its context throughout the training period.
Fig. 3.7 shows the connections of the attention layer block of Fig. 3.6. The inputs to this
layer are the input weights Wi and the LSTM layer output hi. We pass the LSTM layer
output via a tanh layer after being scaled by the input weights Wi and the input bias vector
bi to generate correlation vectors mi given in (3.12).
mi = tanh (Wi · he2i + bi) (3.12)
This correlation vector ((3.12)) represents the effect of each input based on the present.
Hence, we multiply it with the query vector Wq which has the global knowledge of each
input tuple in the present input sequence to provide deep horizontally spanning inputs for
the inference process as shown in (3.13). This vector is then passed through a softmax
layer to generate si in (3.14). This normalized values is scaled by the input vectors hi and
59
summed to generate the attention vector Zi in (3.15).














This layer in conjunction with the fully connected layer tries to reconstruct the input se-
quence. This layer creates an intermediate output h
di using the previous output yi−1, the
context vector Z and the previous hidden state h
di−1 of the previous unit di−1. Equation
(3.16) defines this relationship where Ψ is a nonlinear function of LSTM cells. Again, bias
vector is omitted for brevity.
h
di = Ψ (hdi−1,yi−1,Z) (3.16)
3.4.8 Output Layer
The output layer is a simple dense layer with the same number of units as there are unique
features in the input sequences. The output of this layer is given in (3.17) where h
di,Wz and
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bz are the decoding LSTM layer output, the layer weight and the bias vector respectively.
yi = Wz · hdi + bz (3.17)
The yi is then passed through a softmax layer for each of the outputs. The whole model is
implemented using the Keras/TensorFlow deep learning tool [14].
3.4.9 Error Estimator and Anomaly Detection
Error Estimator
Given ~x ∈ Zp which serves as the input and target sequences, we aim to regenerate the
sequence at the output by creating ~x′ ∈ Zp. Therefore, the perfect result is when ~xk ≡ ~x′k
but this is hardly feasible because of the high randomness caused by interrupts and other
events in the traces. Hence, when we perform f : ~x 7→ ~x′ given ~x as the ground truths, the
deviation ~d = |~x−~x′| is the difference between the ground truth and the predicted value for
the given sequence. This deviation becomes the prediction error values which we process
further to decide if an anomaly has occurred or not. Since this is a categorical prediction,
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where; h > 0 is the bandwidth
φ is the standard normal density function
Anomaly Detection
Therefore, in keeping with the closed-world approach, we only examine the error values
returned by the standard evaluation data Vj where j refers to the scenario under con-
sideration. The deviations ~dv =
{
d1, d2, d3, ..., d|Vj |
}
from the validation data form an
independent and identically distributed random variables which are used to generate the
probability density function (PDF) ρ of the errors in a non-parametric way by fitting it to
a kernel density estimator (kde). We use the normally distributed kernel which is given
mathematically in (3.18). When we predict the ρ of both the typical and atypical se-
quences using the kernel, it generates ρ values in which there is a sharp contrast between
the ρ values of the normal and anomalous sequences. If there is a high imbalance in the data
categories, one option is to determine the value of ρτ by visually inspecting the boundaries
between the ρ values from the normal and anomalous sequences during training. Then,
during testing, a sequence is anomalous if ρ < ρτ. The drawback of this approach is that
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it is time-consuming and subject to inefficiencies as the boundary between the two classes
may be fuzzy sometimes. The other option used by the authors in [55] is the determination
of the ρτ by choosing the value that maximizes the Fβ using the validation data. And a
sequence is labeled anomalous if ρ > ρτ. The obvious drawback of this approach is that
the hyper-parameters like the β, are set by the heuristic method. In our design, we use
the knowledge gathered up to this step to convert the anomaly framework to a supervised
learning model. We build the model by training a KNN classifier with the ρ values from
the validation data (negative class) and a fraction of the anomalous data (positive class).
This method removes the time-consuming and error-prone process of setting a threshold
value by the heuristic method. It also avoids the trial and error process of selecting the
hyperparameters for any maximization function.
3.4.10 Online Update
An online anomaly framework is not expected to stop working to retrain the model when
there is a need for an update. In this framework, we have a passive feedback mechanism
which runs an update on the framework if the false positive or false negative rate increases
beyond an administrator’s set limit. Firstly, to update the neural network predictor; we
utilize the TensorFlow API called train_on_batch to make a single pass of the batch of
the input that was noticed to have caused a significant deviation on the accuracy of the
model. This API updates the model weight without retraining the model. For the online
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update of the KNN classifier, we are mindful of the fact that the KNN graph has to be
limited to avoid overwhelming the memory. Therefore, we use the concept of ’freshness’ to
ensure that the newly arrived data from the updated recurrent neural network predictor
displaces the oldest living portion of the data used to train the classifier, and the update
method highlighted in [82] is used to update the KNN graph.
3.4.11 Limitations
While this approach solves one of the limitations of the cluster-based anomaly framework
of Section 3.3, it is still not able to solve the temporal analysis that incorporates the timing
information of the kernel-level events. Also, unlike the anomaly framework of Section 3.3,
the anomaly framework of Section 3.4 cannot detect event anomalies occasioned by changes
in the distribution of the events. Therefore, we address these limitations in Section 3.5
when we introduce the ensemble anomaly framework that jointly targets anomalies that
affect the order, frequency, and the temporal properties of the kernel-level events of the user
processes.
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3.5 An Ensemble Deep Recursive Attentive Anomaly
Detection Framework
3.5.1 Target Anomalous Scenarios












Figure 3.8: Target Anomaly Scenarios for the Ensemble Anomaly Framework
We illustrate the threat vector of the anomalies we aim to catch to highlight the changes in
the target scenarios amongst the anomaly detection frameworks of Section 3.3, Section 3.4,
and that of Section 3.5, we use the same UAV application but with added changes to the
scenarios that this anomaly framework targets. Again, the normal profile consists of four
states: Takeoff, Cruising, Landing, Landed. The system call events resulting from the states
Takeoff −→ Cruising −→ Landing −→ Landed mark one complete standard operational
cycle logs. Therefore, if there is an insertion of a malicious code block into the sequence of
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the normal execution as depicted in Fig. 3.8, one or more of the five possibilities will occur
regarding how the malicious code affects the overall profile of the kernel-level events when
the tasks complete one cycle of execution. We explain these possible outcomes, and how
our ensemble anomaly detection framework handles each case next:
a) No Syscall generated : the Malicious code surreptitiously changes the destination co-
ordinates or the cruise control operation without producing system call events. This
anomaly detection framework do not target this type of anomaly, and since this type
of anomaly leaves no data to be analyzed, we would not label this a limitation.
b) Seen Syscall (same order): the Malicious code block can cleverly yield the same
temporal ordering of the system calls between adjoining tasks so that transition in
the normal profile is imitated. While this kind of attack requires knowing the temporal
ordering of the normal profile, it is not an impossibility as demonstrated in [84]. This
scenario can be captured by this anomaly detection framework.
c) Seen Syscall (different order): if the inserted block of code creates system call events
sequence that is made up of already seen event types but with a markedly different
order from the learned profile, this anomaly detection framework can detect this type
of anomaly.
d) Seen and Unseen Syscall : also, when there is a mixture of both seen and unseen
kernel-level events generated as a result of the activity of the Malicious code, this
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anomaly detection framework can detect this type of anomaly.
e) Seen Syscall (varying execution time): if there is clock manipulation attack or denial of
service attack resulting in a markedly varying execution time, our ensemble anomaly
detection framework can also capture such an anomaly.
3.5.2 Ensemble Anomaly Detection Framework Architecture
A high-level architecture of the ensemble framework is depicted in Fig. 3.9. The high-
level overview is that we stream system call traces from the instrumented kernel and we
feed the streams to the framework via the feature processor module. The two parallel
models are concurrent but the event-driven model lags the time-driven model because they
target different kinds of anomalies in the traces as highlighted in Section 3.5.1. While the
time-driven model targets the temporal ordering of the system calls, denial of service or
clock manipulation attacks, and injection attacks like buffer overflow which changes the
system call arguments, the event-driven model targets anomalies that tend to cause a burst
consisting of seen/unseen system calls in the kernel-level events of a process. The two
pools work on the same principle of sequence replication but while the time-driven model
replicates the system calls, and the instruction cycle (IC) count, the event-driven model
focuses on regenerating the SRFout of the input within a window of observation. The
























Figure 3.9: Architecture of the Ensemble Anomaly Detection Framework
set an upper bound for each of the models. The feature processor stores the system call IDs
temporarily in a buffer pending onward processing (conversion to SRFin) and transmission
to the event-driven model. The buffer is necessary because FTD/FED > 1 where FTD and
FED are the operational frequencies (number of times they are called) of the time-driven and
event-driven models respectively. In summary, while time-driven model targets anomalous
sequence calls with local temporal profile, event-driven model targets anomalous system
call sequences that has long temporal profile. The three main modules that make up the
ensemble framework of Fig. 3.9 are the feature processor, predictor, and the detector, and
they are explained next.
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Feature Processor
The system call traces contain several properties, but the features of interest to us are the
timestamp, system call ID, and the system call arguments. To create a relative deterministic
model, we avoided using the CPU clock or wall clock as a timestamp; alternatively, we use
the CPU IC count. We use the system call IDs to separate the events to their corresponding
processes in case where we monitor several applications. Therefore, a single trace is a
multivariate variable which undergoes further processing to yield the desired features. Given
timestamp as t, system call string name as k and system call arguments as a, we process
these properties to yield a multi-input feature space that we feed to our models.
Timestamp and System Call Classes During the learning phase, we store the
training samples in a database, but the model can run online after learning. Given an
observation of system call samples {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sn} in storage where n is the total number
of the observed traces, then the function, B of (3.19) defines the time window between
system calls. The essence is for the model to capture both the ordering of the system calls
and the relative duration within such a relationship. This way, for malicious code which
does not alter the ordering of the system calls but creates anomalous execution times or
delays which do not match the relative duration defined by B will be detected.
B : (ti, ti+1) 7−→ ti+1 − ti; i ∈ N (3.19)
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In order to get Sin in Fig. 3.9, we use the function defined in (3.20) to encode the system
call ID strings into their corresponding Linux tables. There are a total of 330 unique system
calls in the X_64 platform.
S : k 7−→ w; where w = {w ∈ N | 1 ≤ w ≤ 330} (3.20)
System Call Arguments The system call argument is alphanumeric and special char-
acter strings. System call arguments are part of the features we process because it has some
compelling distribution which we use to discriminate between a valid and incorrect behav-
ior. The motivation is that while there is no consistent frequency distribution in a particular
system call, a little reorganization (e.g., sorting) of the relative frequency distribution of the
characters yields a thoughtful insight into its usability. System call arguments are strings,
and in order to maintain a relatively few vocabularies, we encode the string characters using
ASCII values. This encoding provides us with a range of unique 256 classes. After en-
coding the string values, we calculate the frequency distribution, and the relative frequency
distribution for the 256 classes in each system call argument. Our aim is not to check how
consistent each ASCII value is across the kernel-level events but to find the steepness of the
distribution of the characters when we sort them. Checking for consistency of each ASCII
value detected during training amounts to assuming that the other characters not seen dur-
ing learning cannot be present in the system call arguments during operation, and this is
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unrealistic. Therefore, we do not consider the kind of ASCII values present in the argu-
ment; we are somewhat concerned about the steepness of the distribution of the characters
per system call. Although we do not expect a completely normal distribution, legitimate
system calls tend to maintain a fairly regular distribution. Therefore, we posit that this
will improve the model accuracy because malicious codes that target the system arguments
like buffer overflow usually stuff the system call arguments with more characters or some
unprintable characters to achieve their aim. Although tools like autocorrelation or Naive
Bayes can be used to understand the relationship amongst features, these tools learn on
the assumptions that each sample is independent (thereby lacking temporal relationship),
and it focuses on the relationship amongst features while we focus on the distribution of
the sorted ASCII values in a sample regardless of the features it contains.
To illustrate our point further, let us assume that a system call argument returned the
following frequency distribution x = [34, 0, 56, 78, 27, 10, 34, 0, 23, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 75, 6, 68, 0, 90]
for 19 ASCII classes monitored. Then we compute the relative frequency distribution
(RFDxi) of one class using RFDxi = xi/
∑|x|
j=1 xj where j 6= i. Therefore, the RFDx is
given as [.06,0,.11,.15,.05,.02,.07,0,.05,0,0,.01,0,0,.15,.01,.13,0,.18]. Now the sorted system
call argument relative frequency distribution, Ain of Fig. 3.9 is the sorted version of RFD.
To drive home our argument, Fig. 3.10 is a plot of the sorted Ain and unsorted Ain. When
we present the unsorted Ain to a machine learning model, it tries to learn the relationship
amongst the features at the index of the x-axis. Therefore, it takes only a structured input
71
whereby the index of the incoming features are determined by the class of the feature. On
the other hand, when we present the sorted Ain to a model, we are forcing it to learn how
the steepness of the distribution that connects the observed classes of the ASCII values in
a sample without recourse to a fixed index for a particular class. Therefore, we impose the
condition of (3.21) where n has a maximum value of 256.
Ai ≥ Ai+1, . . . ,≥ An where n ∈ N (3.21)
Hence, (3.22) provides the mapping from the raw string arguments to the Ain feature
highlighted in the architecture of Fig. 3.9.
A : L 7−→M where (3.22)
L = {l ∈ N | 1 ≤ l ≤ 256} (3.23)
M = {m ∈ R | 0 ≤m ≤ 1} (3.24)
256∑
i=1
Ai = 1 (3.25)
Then, for every FTD/FED, the system call relative frequency distribution (SRFin) is com-
puted in the event-driven lane and transmitted to the model block of that channel.
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Sorted SARFD Unsorted SARFD
Figure 3.10: Sorted vs Unsorted Ain
Predictor
The time-driven and event-driven LSTM network models of the predictor are exactly the
attention-based autoencoder framework described from Section 3.4.3 to Section 3.4.8 in




The detector module of Fig. 3.9 comprises of the error estimator and the anomaly detection
sub-modules. The error estimator sub-module computes the prediction errors. In contrast,
the anomaly detection sub-module applies the probability bounds to the error values and
classify the input sub-samples that generated the error values as either normal or malicious.
Error Estimator The error estimator computes categorical and continuous error values.
We calculate the prediction errors concerning the order of the system call using categorical
binary values. We use the absolute value difference error computation for the IC profile
since it has continuous error values. Below, we provide the details of how we do these error
estimation computation.
Time-Driven System Call Events: Given the system call events, Sin in Fig. 3.9,
as part of the input stream, part of the objectives of the time-driven model is to detect
variations in the order, and composition of the predicted system call events, Sout. There-
fore, the target during learning is that given {Sin : S1, S2, S3, ..., SWin}, a shifted version
of the system call events, {Sout : SWin+1, SWin+2, SWin+3, ..., SWin+Wout} is predicted
where Win and Wout are 15 and 5 respectively in the time-driven model. Hence, when
we have f : (Sin,Bin,Ain) 7−→ (Sout,Tout) given Sin as the ground truths, the devi-
ation, ~d = |Sini− Souti| at index, i is the difference between the ground truth and the
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predicted value for the given sequence. Since the system call events are categorical values,





Sini 6= Souti (3.26)
Time-Driven IC Count: To monitor and detect deviations which affect the ex-
ecution cycle of events like denial of service attacks, we compare the predicted execution
cycle with the actual IC of events. While attacks targeting the order of system call events
can also affect the execution cycle, and vice-versa, we predict both the order and IC count
of an event with our multiple output design to enable us determine what kind of anomaly is
affecting the system, and make an informed decision during the investigation of the abnor-
mality. Given Bin as the ground truths, and Tout as the predicted IC count, we compute






Event-Driven Relative System Call Events: The time-driven network of
Fig. 3.9 can capture anomalies that does the following: a) alters the ordering of known
system call events. b) changes the sequence of system call events by creating unknown
system call events. c) changes the expected execution cycle of observed system call events.
However, the time-driven network lacks the ability to detect variations that change the dis-
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tribution of the system call events as a result of changes in context occasioned by an error
or an attack. And this is where the event-driven network of Fig. 3.9 comes in. While most
of the anomalies monitored by the time-driven network have a local profile, the target of
the event-driven model is to capture anomalies that span over a long profile (like thousands
of events). Hence, the difference in the frequency of operation of the two models. Also, the
proposed approach in Section 3.3 target anomalies due to variations in the distribution of
the events but these anomaly frameworks do not take into account the temporal nature of
the system call events. Therefore, with our use of RNN to capture the temporal variation
of the distribution of the events with time, we create a model that takes into account the
behavior of the sources of the events into the design consideration. From Fig. 3.9, the
Buffer serves the purpose of temporarily storing the events for the event-driven model until
the number of events reaches the computational window. For our framework, we use 10000
as the computational window since that is the window used for engineering the anoma-
lies in the experiments. Given SRFin in Fig. 3.9 as normalized inputs of dimension 330
(maximum number of system call types in a Linux machine) in a 10000 event window, we
predict the distribution of events in the next 10000 event window. This way, we eliminate
the limitation of clustering-based anomaly schemes like that of Section 3.3 which consider
each 10000 event window as an independent observation. The predicted distribution of
events is the SRFout and has the same 330 dimension as the input. Therefore, the event-
driven model error is given in (3.28) where Ji is the frequency distribution of the system
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data constitute random variables which we have no knowledge of the underlying distribution.
However, since they are error values, we are interested in creating an upper bound or
threshold to detect anomalies. Hence, the generation of a threshold value for the prediction
errors. Because we know the sample µ and variance σ2, we transform the Bienaymé-
Chebyshev inequality to compute the threshold. The inequality guarantees that no more
than a certain fraction of values can be more that a certain distance from the mean, µ. The
inequality is stated mathematically in (3.29).




Although the inequality computes the absolute bound with the assumption of a symmetric
distribution, we use it in our model because we are only interested in the range where
the prediction error d − µ > 1. Hence, lack of symmetry will not affect the threshold
computation. Therefore, we interchange Υ in (3.29) with |d−µ| to derive (3.30) which we
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use to compute the decreasing probability for increasing deviation |d− µ| where d > µ.
P (d > µ) = P (|X − µ| ≥ |d− µ|) = σ
2
(d− µ)2 (3.30)
One of the advantages that this technique provides is that we do not have to know the other
parameters of the underlying probability distribution. Also, instead of creating a binary
threshold of True or False values as was the case in the approach discussed in Section 3.4.9,
this probability gives us an opportunity to quantize the anomaly scores into bands per one
complete cycle of operation like the safety integrity level (SIL) provided by safety standards
like IEC 61508 [6]. These quantized levels are called anomaly level probability, (ALρ) and
each level depends on the value of the probability from (3.30). As (3.30) measures how the
error values are clustered around the mean, our framework creates high fidelity predictions
(reconstruction of the normal profile sequence) to ensure that (3.30) performs optimally
and reduces false negatives.
3.5.3 Limitations
This anomaly framework solves the limitations of the anomaly frameworks in Section 3.3 and
Section 3.4 but it does not address the data imbalance problem which is prevalent in anomaly
detection research. Since anomaly detection frameworks target those rare anomalous con-
texts, it is important to develop a model which can draw insight from the latent space of
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both normal and anomalous context distributions to broaden the horizon of anomalies it
can catch and reduce false positives. Therefore, in Section 3.6, we introduce the CGAN-
derived network which solves the data imbalance problem and reduces the complexity of the
anomaly detection framework in a process kernel events.
3.6 Anomaly Detection Framework using CGAN
Applications and cyber-physical systems are designed with high-reliability requirements.
Therefore, most of the time, the data collected from these systems contains normal operating
conditions and some occasional anomalous incidents. Because of the rarity of occurrence of
these unusual incidents, many datasets used by researchers to model system profiles in this
domain are highly imbalanced, resulting in the following consequences:
a) bias is inherently introduced in the models built using the imbalanced data. Since ran-
dom guess is guaranteed to return high accuracy due to the data imbalance, machine
learning models appear redundant.
b) adaptability of anomaly detection frameworks from one system to another with vary-
ing ratios of typical to anomalous samples returns poor performance because bias
varies from one system to the other. This variability in the composition of the differ-
ent datasets makes generalization difficult.
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Also, imbalanced data creates overfitting and introduces poor generalization on the test
data. Therefore, efficiency of the performance of an algorithm has to take into account
the distribution of the different classes being predicted or classified to ensure that the
performance being claimed actually performs better than a random guess. For example, a
dataset that has normal class of 95% and anomalous class of 5% already has a 95% accuracy
using human guess. Also, since the aim of anomaly detection frameworks is to detect that
critical 5% of anomalous samples in this example, this 95% performance accuracy in this
regard may not make sense without taking into account the true negative, true positive and
other metrics that demonstrate how much of the critical samples were correctly detected.
In some applications, the amount of human and capital resources required to investigate
or deal with the effect of false positive classification is also huge, therefore, an effective
anomaly framework should have the ability to detect the anomalous samples while reducing
the incidents of false positives. Having carefully considered the qualities that an anomaly
detection framework should possess even when the training data is imbalanced, we discuss
the different modules of the AD-CGAN. First, we discuss the inner-workings of the CGANs
of Fig. 3.11 in Section 3.6.1, and in Section 3.6.2, we discuss the complete architecture of
AD-CGAN as shown in Fig. 3.12.
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3.6.1 CGAN
In this section, we discuss the modules of the CGAN with particular attention to the two
























Figure 3.11: Architecture of the CGAN of AD-CGAN
Generator
The generator is a stack of artificial neural networks in which the number of cells doubled
for each succeeding layer. The dense layer are sandwiched with activation layers and the
last layer before the output layer has a batch normalization layer as a regularization scheme
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that makes the network robust and improve the generalization properties of the network.
Given a latent input, ~z, a conditional input, ~c, (3.31) is the generator equation where G
is a non-linear function like an artificial neural networks. The output, ~yg of (3.31) is a
sequence of multivariate data representing the context being modeled.
G : (~z,~c) 7−→ ~yg (3.31)
The ~yg can be discrete, continuous or a mixture of both. As an additional stabilization
measure to avoid mode collapse and overfitting, the output, ~yg is augmented with a white
noise as described in Section 3.6.1 before it is fed to the discriminator.
Discriminator
In [12], it has been shown that some assumptions like finite log-likelihood-ratio between the
generated data, ~yg and the true value, ~xd, and the non-saturation of the Janson-Shannon
divergence, JS[~yg|~xd] to a maximum value do not hold in most cases. Therefore, an addi-
tive noise from a normal distribution with varying variance ensures that the discriminator
does not overfit during training. We added the noise to each sample, yg ∈ ~yg and xd ∈ ~xd
because adding it to the generated output only could also aid the discriminator in overfitting
on the training data. In the discriminator model of Fig. 3.11, we use dropout in the second
and third layers to reduce overfitting by reducing the interdependent learning amongst the
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neurons. In (3.32), we provide the equation which captures the relationship between the
input and output of the discriminator.
D : (~y, x̃) 7−→ ~yd where ~y ⊇ ~yg, ~xd (3.32)
During training, AD-CGAN objective loss function that captures the relationship between
the generator and discriminator is given in (3.33) where LG and LD represent the generator
and discriminator loss respectively.
LD = E[log (D(~xd, x̃))]
+E[log (1−D(G(~z,~c), x̃))]
LG = E[log (D(G(~z,~c), x̃)))]
(3.33)
Controlling Discriminator Overfitting
We discuss the effect of adding synthetic noise to both the generator output, ~yg and the




is finite. However, in some chaotic real world scenarios, given
G : (~z,~c) 7−→ ~yg where the support is {z ∈ ~z, c ∈ ~c : G(z, c) 6= 0}, the intersection
between the support of the generator and the support of the distribution that produced ~xd
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in high dimensional space may be ∅ if the underlying distributions are degenerate. Hence,
the addition of synthetic noise as shown in (3.32) aims to create an overlapping support for
the two underlying distributions. This ensures that the log-likelihood remains finite and
Jensen-Shannon divergence produces a continuous function which does not saturate to a
















Figure 3.12: AD-CGAN Framework for Anomaly Detection
3.6.2 AD-CGAN
The main blocks of Fig. 3.12 are single class CGAN, binary class CGAN, Embedding, and




Given a dataset for training that consists of normal and anomalous profiles, we determine
the number of samples of each category. If the ratio of the majority class to the minority
class is high and could introduce bias in the model, we learn the profile of the minority class
using the single class CGAN. With the the single class CGAN trained on the minority class,
we use it to generate more data samples of the minority class to augment the number of the
minority class samples until the data samples of the majority and minority class samples are
fairly even. The aim of the single class CGAN is to train the single class CGAN generator
(Gs) with the multivariate data, ~z,~c so that the generator output, ~yg and the real samples
of the class of interest, ~xd when clustered, show evidence that ~xd and ~yg are drawn from
the same underlying distribution. We measure this similarity with the use of the stochastic
neighbor embedding algorithm [41]. As will be shown in experiment’s section, when the
Gs is sufficiently trained, the generator output, ~yg and the real samples, ~xd form a single
indistinguishable cluster.
Binary Class CGAN
The binary class CGAN trains on the normal and anomalous samples from the original
and augmented samples from the single class CGAN. Unlike the the single class CGAN, the
aim of the binary class CGAN is to train the binary class CGAN generator (Gb) with the
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multivariate binary class data, ~z,~c such that the anomalous samples from the generator
output, ~yg, and the anomalous samples of the real samples, ~xd form a single distinct cluster
while the corresponding normal samples from both the generator and the real samples form
a different, distinct cluster. Therefore, we can say that the major difference between the
single class CGAN and the binary class CGAN is that the former trains to merge two
samples that belong to the same class while the latter trains to fuse the same class samples
in one cluster and diverge different class samples to a different cluster. Therefore, the
output of the single class CGANis a single cluster while the binary class CGAN produces
two clusters.
Embedding
When we need to test some given samples, the binary class CGAN generates a matching
number of samples comprising of both fake normal and fake malicious profiles, and this
output, ~yg is a multivariate data of the same dimension as the real samples, ~xd. Therefore,
the number of samples generated by the binary class CGAN, ~yg is the same as the number
of the real samples, ~xd. The significance of using the binary class CGAN output in the
embedding are: a) when plotted using a visualization tool during training, it gives us an
idea of how the CGANs are able to learn the profiles of the data being studied; b) during
testing, the fake labels used in the CGANs to generate ~yg guide us in constructing the
different centroids of each class by giving us the ability to separate the fake normal samples
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from the fake malicious samples in the generated data. Also, while the dimension of the
real sample, ~xd is fixed, AD-CGAN can handle data of arbitrary dimension by preprocessing
the arbitrary dimensional data to the dimension of the real samples, ~xd using the sparse
principal component analysis algorithm [88]. Furthermore, we use the stochastic neigh-
bor embedding algorithm to ensure that points in the high-dimensional space correspond to
nearby embedded low-dimensional points, and distant points in high-dimensional space cor-
respond to distant embedded low-dimensional points. Given {~yg, ~xd} ∈ ~y, (3.34) shows the
neighbor embedding algorithm which we employ to compute the conditional probabilities,
Pj|i that highlights the probability of point j choosing point i as a neighbor.
Pj|i =
exp (−|yi−yj |2/2σ2i )∑
k 6=i exp (−|yi−yk|
2/2σ2i )
(3.34)
To ensure symmetry, we compute the joint probability, Pij of the similarity between points
i and j using (3.35). Since Pj|j = 0, Pjj = 0 in (3.35). In this work, our neighbor
embedding algorithm of (3.34) produces embedding output in two dimensions to make it




where N = number of rows of ~y (3.35)
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Detector
From Fig. 3.12, (3.36) represents the embedding from higher to lower two-dimensional
space. The resulting output is a set, S = {(m1, n1), (m2, n2), ..., (mt, nt)} of tuples of
point coordinates of both the real and generated samples.
f : Rp×q 7−→ Rp×2 where p = number of samples (3.36)
During evaluation, we use the labels used in the Gb generator to separate the coordinates
of the fake normal samples from the fake anomalous samples, and compute the centroid of












 ∀ i ∈ {0, 1} (3.37)
Using t-statistics, we derive the distance of new points being tested from the centroid using
(3.38) where σs and (m̄s, n̄s) are the evaluation sample standard deviation and mean
respectively. Since the centroid is a vector, computing distance becomes simple vector
subtraction standardized using the standard deviation as shown in (3.38). For simplification
purposes, we use the norm of the output of (3.38) to measure the absolute distance from
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∀ i ∈ {0, 1} (3.38)
Therefore, anomaly detection decision is taken using (3.42) which selects the cluster with






i ∀ i ∈ {0, 1} (3.39)
In cases where the distance is equal from the two clusters, we break the tie by using (3.41)
to select a cluster for the test point. In (3.40), we compute the probability of the test point




∀ i ∈ {0, 1} (3.40)
Then, we determine which cluster the test point belongs to using the probabilities of (3.40)
and (3.41) in (3.42).
Ck =

C0 = 1−C1, if k = 0
C1, if k = 1
(3.41)
Since the Gs has been used to do data augmentation, the evaluation data samples used
to generate the centroids are balanced, hence, the justification for the use of the Bernoulli
probability distribution selection when a tie occurs. As the context changes, we update the
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centroids via batch training with the new data collected from the network.
Ci =

C0, P (1) < P (0)
C1, P (0) < P (1)
Ck, P (1) == P (0)
(3.42)
This parameter update can be done in parallel with the deployed algorithm. When a new
set of model parameters are generated, we update the model by copying the new parameters
to our deployed framework.
3.6.3 Limitations
One limitation of the AD-CGAN anomaly framework we discovered is that the single class
CGAN can not train on data in which the minority class data is only a handful of samples
(< 900), therefore, in our future research endeavors, we will be looking to improve AD-
CGAN to be able to handle this set of data. Also, the internal architecture of CGANs is
complex and this may limit the number of concurrent deployment of AD-CGAN in a single
device. Therefore, in the next section, we discuss our distributed algorithm that enables
scalability of the anomaly detection frameworks we have discussed thus far.
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3.7 Distributed Algorithm for Anomaly
Detection Tasks in Edge Computing
3.7.1 Motivation
The downside of the IoE era is the increased connectivity that enables an automated system
to handle both our safety and non-safety critical data and actions. A breach in the intended
behavior of the connected devices could prove catastrophic as they manage our daily ac-
tivities from medicine to autonomous vehicles, avionics, and power systems. This era of
increased connectivity increases the vulnerability of edge devices as they are characterized
by constrained computing and energy resources. Hence, the need to run other security
and safety control modules to maintain the integrity of their operations in addition to the
primary functional requirement. This additional requirement means that these edge de-
vices have to manage their available resources to satisfy both the primary objective and the
anomaly model. While some of the applications may not require online anomaly monitoring
due to the low-risk level associated with their operations, some others that perform critical
tasks within a constrained time window require a constant update on the integrity of its
process. Therefore, to minimize the impact of the anomaly framework on the edge device,













































Figure 3.14: Edge Network with Diverse Nodes for the Distributed Algorithm
within the network created by a Wi-Fi or Ethernet hotspot. The offloading ensures that
the connected devices satisfy both the demands of the main application and that of the
anomaly framework.
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3.7.2 Definition of Terms and Assumptions
The network consists of nodes of diverse capabilities and behavior and an access point like
a router. While the node can access the internet and other external services via the access
point, our network does not include nodes in the cloud or outside the local network. Our
design brings online capability to a node which may or may not accommodate the extra
strain on system resources introduced by doing anomaly detection on applications in the
node. While the cloud boasts of unlimited resources, latency constraints and the fact that
some of the nodes are mobile restricts our design to a local network of nodes. On the positive
side, the proximity constraints provided by the access point device ensures that we have
an idea of the worst latency conditions and the nodes can easily adapt their applications
according to the prevailing local conditions. As the network condition readily available
when the node connects to the access point, the nodes can adaptively export the anomaly
application wholly or partially to other peers in the network by running its task manager
algorithm that is embedded in the application. Overall, the network aims to optimize the
processing time of tasks and reduce the number of tasks dropped for exceeding the response
time constraint. Therefore, the application aims to address the question of which part of the
anomaly framework should run locally or on a peer to reduce processing time. In making
this decision, the capacity of the peers, round trip time to peers, number of tasks on peers,
energy level of peers, etc are taken into consideration in the task management algorithm.
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Hence, there is a competition between the local resources and the transmission medium.
Before we introduce the model parameters, we define the following behavior of the ad-hoc
network:
y every node that generates a task also acts as a sink for the task whether it was
executed locally or in another peer.
y as with all wireless or wired local networks, every traffic passes through the access
point. Hence, the capacity of the network is limited by the capacity of the access point
node. Bluetooth and other peer-to-peer technologies that do not support multi-input,
multi-output paradigm are not considered because our application is multi-threaded.
y in the dataflow model of Fig. 3.13, the application has been split into parts with
designations of possible points of execution. If a task is offloaded at the predictor
stage, then the peer that executes the task determines where the detector runs but
the result must go back to the source of the task.
y movement of peers within the network does not alter the network topology.
y nodes do not route traffic. Therefore, the ad-hoc network is a one-hop network, and
the one-hop is the access point node.
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3.7.3 Distributed Algorithm Model
We model the execution flow of Fig. 3.13 with a directed acyclic graph (DAG)G = (V,E, sv)
made up of a set of v task segments V = {vj|1 ≤ j ≤ v}, a set of e edges or arcs
E = {(p, q)|p, q ∈ N}, and a set of instruction counter tag sv attached to every task
segment identifying the number of CPU instructions needed to execute the task v. The task
segments enjoy the benefit of parallelism provided via threads and the number of threads
that can be created on a particular device is a function of the device resources spared for
anomaly detection after the main application has taken its own required resources. If a
task, v is to be offloaded to a peer, ZeroMQ sockets are used to transfer data between
peers in the network. Hence, the ports in Fig. 3.13 are attached to ZeroMQ sockets. We
chose ZeroMQ in our design because sockets can disappear and reappear without needing
to restart the pair. Hence, we can scale up or down the number of concurrent predictors
or detectors at runtime to optimize the latency reduction. Therefore, with the knowledge
of the properties of the graph G, the CPU capacity, α of the node n, the fraction of the
CPU for anomaly detection, β and the capacity of the wireless channels, B, the problem
becomes finding the minimum task finish time of v task segments, V = {vj|1 ≤ j ≤ v}
given a n set of peer nodes N = {np|1 ≤ p ≤ n}. To get the peers parameters required
for computing the task finish time algorithm, the nodes rely on the access point node to re-
duce the congestion occasioned by parameter updates. If each peer has to query each other
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for updates, then each node requires 2× n messages to get a view of the network. And
considering that all these messages pass through the access point, (2× n× n) messages
will have to pass through the wireless channel B for parameter update alone. We consider
this a significant strain on the network considering that these updates are frequent. Hence,
our decision to use the access point node for parameter update where a broadcast signal is
used to query the peers and send parameter update. Therefore, parameter update in this
instance only requires ((2× n) + n) messages.
Therefore, given the instruction count, sv of a task segment, and CPU resource of the node








In (3.43), j denotes the predictors and detectors of Fig. 3.13. If the size of the task to be




















From (3.43) and (3.44), we derive the cost of processing a task as given in (3.45) where
rm = 1, and rn ∈ {0,1}. Since all the peers share the same wireless bandwidth, then∑
(n,m∈E) en,m|rn− rm| = B and en,m > 0 in (3.44). Also, in (3.44), we assume the
same data size for both the forward and backward transmission. Simplifying (3.44) further,















Now, given tasks with latency requirements, tmax, the problem reduces to minimizing (3.46)
such that tvj ≤ tvjmax, ∀j ∈ V . Finally, this minimization algorithm is solved by each node
independently with the help of the network information supplied by the access point node.
tV = tVn + tVn,m (3.46)
3.7.4 Implementation of the Distributed Algorithm in a Node
Task Generation
The nodes of Fig. 3.15 have system resources of different capacities and run diverse types





























Figure 3.15: Implementation of the Anomaly Task Distribution Algorithm in a Node
time-sensitive. Hence, the size of the data that the processes {P1, P2, ..., Pn} of Fig. 3.15
emit vary in size and time sensitivity. When kernel events of a process P is fed to the
model of Fig. 3.15 as data, a task Tp is created and transferred to the task queue. To aid in
task management and routing, each Tp has as properties; data, task-type, task-uuid, task-
owner-name, task-size, and the task-creation-time. The task-type determines the stage of
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the processing (predictor or detector) while task-uuid identifies the source node for routing
back results if the task is processed in a peer. The size of the task of a process, P in bytes
is denoted as dp while the sp is the number of CPU instruction cycle needed for the task,
Tp’s execution. We assume a uniform dp for each Tp of a unique P since the input data is
structured with a known dimension. Also, tasks can come from peers that have determined
that it is cheaper (in terms of time) for their tasks to be executed in this node as shown in
Fig. 3.15.
Task Manager
The task manager does the cost estimation which determines where a task is executed
taking into account the frequency of task generation (both internal and external generation),
the nodes profile and the parameters supplied by the access point node. Equation (3.44)
represents the latency of executing task segments in a peers node and this information is
provided by the access point node which we have designed to have a complete view of the
network. Since (3.45) is the latency of executing a task segment in a peer, (3.46) can be
modified to become (3.47) which gives the end-to-end latency of a task. Also, because (3.47)
is not trivial to compute, we use the experimental value latency obtained from the network
profile parameters (which includes the delay, processing time, queue size and node CPU
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load information) supplied by each node to the access point node.
tV = tVn + latency (3.47)
Since node mobility in and out of the network is common, and some tasks can be bursty,
the task manager keeps a routing table which is updated each time the access point node
sends the updated network parameters to all the active nodes. This regular update prevents
the sending of tasks to a stale node. The table maintains a cyclic ascending latency times
from active peer nodes as well as the active peer uuid.
Handle Task
The task execution and offloading is determined by the information computed by the task
manager which annotates the task segments with the point of execution. If a task segment
is marked to executed locally, the execute module is called, otherwise, it sends the task
to the outbox module which uses the routing table information to retrieve the peer node
uuid and the task is dispatched. If the local execution happened on a task, the task-uuid
is compared with the nodes uuid and if the uuid match, the execution result is sent to




The inbox module receives tasks, results, and parameter query/update locally, from peers
and access point node, and makes the necessary check using the received data properties to
take appropriate action as outlined in Fig. 3.15.
3.7.5 Access Point Node
The access point node performs two functions: parameter query and update using broadcast
messages. As we explained in Section 3.7.3, this design reduces the number of messages
required for update by more than 1/3. We are aware that this makes the access point a
Node-1 Node-2 Node-3 Node-N
Params-1 Params-2 Params-2 Params-N
Query Active Nodes Access Point
...
Figure 3.16: Access Point Node of the Distributed Algorithm
single point of failure but since it is central to the network formation in the first place, we
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know that the exit of the access point node terminates the network irrespective of whether
we use it for parameter update or not since the Wi-Fi technology is provided by the access
point.
3.7.6 Limitations
The limitation of this algorithm is that Wi-Fi access point constitutes a single point of
failure but since the design is built around it, we have no choice than to utilize the access
point for our parameter update.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we present our various anomaly detection frameworks that are based on
supervised and unsupervised learning. We start with a kernel event distribution analysis
framework that uses hierarchical clustering for anomaly decision. And from the observed
limitations, we present DL-based frameworks that incrementally addressed all the identified
limitations. Finally, we conclude the chapter with a distribution algorithm that introduces
scalability into the presented anomaly detection approaches. Next, we discuss the experi-





We perform experiments with four benchmark datasets on anomaly detection comprising of
the kernel-level event datasets of processes, network intrusion dataset and an image-based
anomaly benchmark dataset. We generated a fourth benchmark dataset [28] which has now
been made available to the public because the system call dataset of [67] lacks some key
properties needed for an anomaly detection framework of Section 3.5 to holistically monitor
the software application. Therefore, we use the system call benchmark datasets of [67] and
[28] in the anomaly detection framework of Section 3.3. And in the anomaly detection
framework of Section 3.4, we use the [67] dataset. The anomaly detection framework of
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Section 3.5 uses the dataset of [28] since it has the system call ID, timestamp, and the system
call arguments which are input parameters to the framework. Finally, since the anomaly
detection framework of Section 3.6 is a supervised framework, we set up the experiment with
the KDD99 dataset and the Amsterdam Library of Object Images (ALOI) [34] anomaly
dataset. While the KDD99 has the normal profile as the minority class, the aloi dataset
has the anomalous profile as the minority class. Also, the two datasets selected for the
experiments on AD-CGAN comprises of image and network log data, thereby providing a
diverse environment for measuring the effectiveness of the framework. The experiments are
organized in the same order as the proposed anomaly frameworks of Chapter 3.
4.2 Datasets
We describe the four datasets used in the experiments in the following sections.
4.2.1 Dataset I
Dataset I [67] was generated by researchers at the University of Waterloo via various exper-
iments on a UAV application controller. This dataset is used to measure the performance
of the proposed anomaly frameworks of Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. The dataset is logged
from a qnx rtos deployed on a UAV application. Four experimental scenarios are created,
and the kernel event traces for each is logged. The scenarios are: full-while, fifo-ls, hilRF-
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Table 4.1: Details of the Dataset I Scenarios

















InFin, and sporadic with the folders labeled accordingly. Each category has three subfolders
called train, clean and anomalous. The train sub-folder depicts the normal behavior of the
application, the clean sub-folder is the validation data from the normal operating profile
while the anomalous sub-folder is the deviation from typical characteristic of the applica-
tion. The number of traces and events per trace in each scenario is given in Table 4.1 and
the efficiency of the model is judged by how accurate it is in labeling the traces. The traces
are logged using QNX tracelogger event count setting instead of duration; hence, each trace
has 50000 samples. According to the authors in [66], full-while scenario refers to creating
an additional task that consumes CPU time while the system tasks controlling the UAV
are running. The fifo-ls and sporadic situations derive their names from the scheduling al-
gorithm in the OS kernel, and the hilRf-InFin scenario corresponds to correct performance
behavior but diverges from the training traces.
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4.2.2 Dataset II
To reflect the ever evolving modes of attack on cyber-physical systems, we design some
attack scenarios and log the data to measure the performance of our anomaly frameworks
and we call this data Dataset II [28]. The data is publicly hosted and more detailed
information about the data can also be found in GitHub 1. We stream the data for three
different modes which capture the scenarios explained in Section 3.5.1. Therefore, we label
the datasets Normal, Delay and Pseudo-Random profiles to denote the conditions we set
during the simulations. To ensure efficiency in our experiment, we use the lightweight
Alpine Linux which enables us to scale up or down the active processes as the need arises.
This way, we have a small but powerful kernel which can be packaged in a container and
used for modeling process contexts. Details of the operation of the modes are as follows:
a) Normal Profile: In this mode, theUAV application followed strictly the states defined
in Fig. 4.2 without any internal or external injection or interruption to the best of
our knowledge.
b) Delay Profile: We generate the dataset in this mode by occasionally creating computa-
tionally expensive operations that force the controller to lag in sensing the parameters
of the application. These expensive diversionary computations result in the UAV sen-
sors not polled as supposed, thereby creating instability in the UAV as it struggles to
1https://github.com/Tarbo/SysCall-Dataset
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adjust the set parameters concerning the destination, cruising, and altitude. These
tasks impact the type and order of system calls generated because its execution leads
to the generation of known or unknown system calls that may or may not follow the
Normal profile pattern. This profile is an example of a non-stealth attack as it results
in the crashing of the UAV when the normal state cannot be restored. This scenario is
less complicated than the Pseudo-Random profile because the non-stealth nature cre-
ates high instability, which can be detected by the anomaly frameworks. We achieve
the attack in this mode by exponentially raising the computational intensity of the
fictitious tasks until the UAV crashes.
c) Pseudo-Random Profile: Finally, to increase the complexity of the attack scenarios
and generate an anomaly based on stealth operation, we create a task that leaks the
UAV’s states and parameters via a UDP socket at pseudo-random intervals. We aim
to mimic stealth operation which does not crash the UAV but monitors its activity
for other purposes. Therefore, in the process of monitoring the UAV application, it
generates some system calls which might be different regarding the order, type, and
argument structure of the system calls. Unlike the Delay profile, this operates in
stealth mode and does not lead to the crash of the UAV control application. During
the start of every window mentioned in Table 4.2, we apply a 1/10 probability that
the stealth attack will run in that window. If the stealth attack is to run within a





















Figure 4.1: Interaction Diagram for the Dataset II Generation using Docker
Table 4.2: Details of the Dataset II Profiles
Profile Name No. of Events Generated No. of Events Utilized Window
Normal 436615 430000 10000
Delay 100964 100000 10000
Pseudo-Random 436615 430000 10000
attack to run repeatedly in a sporadic pattern within the window under attack. This
way, we lose control of the distribution of events but gain an opportunity to test the
limit of our anomaly frameworks on a sophisticated scenario.
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Figure 4.2: Finite State Machine Diagram of the UAV Controller for Dataset II
profile we simulate. Because we are monitoring the profile in a window of 10000 events,
the number of events used is less than the number of events generated by a fraction. The
dataset of [28] in the current form is unsupervised (it has no labels), therefore, unsupervised
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anomaly frameworks are the target frameworks. Also, anomaly frameworks that aim to
perform labeling by extracting information from the current form can benefit from the
dataset of [28].
4.2.3 Dataset III (ALOI)
Dataset III [34] is derived from the Amsterdam Library of Object Images [32] project data.
The original dataset contains about 110 images each for the 1000 small objects taken under
different light conditions and viewing angles, yielding a total of 110000 images. From the
original images, a 27 dimensional feature vector was extracted using HSB color histograms.
Some objects were chosen as anomalies and the data was down-sampled such that the
resulting dataset contains 50000 instances including 3.04% anomalies. With just 1508
anomalous samples out of the total 50000 samples, it is difficult to train a model with this
dataset without overfitting on the majority class. And since detection of the anomalous
samples is more critical than detecting the normal profile, we will adopt the multi-stage
process of data augmentation with the single class CGAN of Fig. 3.12.
4.2.4 Dataset IV (KDD99)
Unlike the ALOI dataset of Section 4.2.3, the KDD99 dataset [21] has more than two
categories of data which are broadly classified into malicious and normal profiles. Since
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the test data has more categories of anomalies that are not available in the training data,
we converted the whole data into two categories by collapsing any non-normal category to
a new category called malicious profile. This way, the anomaly framework can be tested on
any kind of normal or anomalous scenarios that were not available during the training phase.
After we binarized the data, the KDD99 dataset has 3925650 samples of the malicious
profile and 972781 samples of the normal profile with 41 multivariate features.
4.3 Anomaly Framework using Event Distribution
Analysis and Clustering Experiments
We apply the hierarchical clustering technique discussed in Section 3.3.9 to each of the
different scenarios mentioned in the datasets of Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2. First, we
build the distance matrix using the Mahalanobis distance and the average-linkage method
separately for the train and Normal traces only and store them as a persistent variable. The
stored matrix helps to reduce the computation time by bypassing the re-computation of the
normal trace matrix when a new trace is being tested. In this case, only the distances of the
new trace to the train or Normal traces is calculated based on which dataset is being tested.
The distance matrix for the train and clean/anomalous traces are combined and used to
build the dendrogram for the dataset in Section 4.2.1 while the Normal, Pseudo-Random,
and Delay profiles matrix of the dataset of Section 4.2.2 are used to build the dendrogram
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for the dataset of [28]. The dendrogram is repeated for all the different scenarios in the
dataset, and in all cases, we build a vector space matrix where the rows are the samples,
and the columns are the features. The train/Normal traces index is numbered sequentially
from {0, ..., n− 1} where n is the total number of traces in the train/Normal category.
The clean, anomalous, Delay or Pseudo-Random traces’ index runs from {n, ...,m− 1}
where m+ 1 is the sum of the total number of traces in the train and clean, anomalous,
Delay or Pseudo-Random category. The number of samples in each category is given in
Table 4.1 for the dataset of [67] while that of [28] is given in Table 4.2.
The Normal profile yields 43 traces of 10000 events each while that of the Delay profile
is 10 traces of the same length as that of the Normal profile. The Pseudo-Random profile
has the same window and has a total of 43 traces. The index2 of the Normal profile are
within the range {0, ...,42} while the index of the Delay profile ranges from 43 to 52. For
the graph of Fig. 5.7, the index of the Pseudo-Random profile ranges from {43, ...,85}.
2The index numbers are automatically assigned by the dendrogram based on row position of the
trace in the original dataset.
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4.4 Deep Recursive Attentive Anomaly Detection
Framework Experiments
This experiment uses the dataset of [67] described in Section 4.2.1. Each experimental
scenario has normal training data Ti, normal validation data Vi, normal test data from
the clean folder Si, and the anomalous data Ai, where i refers to the different scenarios
in the experiment. The flow of our experiment is as depicted in Fig. 3.6. The trace logs
are processed with Algorithm 1 and the input features are extracted. This step creates a
univariate sequence of features. We create input and output windows using the univariate
features. The output window reflects the lookahead length while the input window is
determined via heuristic to provide a balance between temporal information capture and
computing complexity.The ratio of the input sequence length to the output sequence length
is represented by Φ = θin/θout. Therefore, Φi is the input-output window ratio for lookahead
length i. As we stated in the Section 3.3.2, we assume that the profiles depicting the
standard operational behavior is devoid of anomalies. The length of the input sequence is
varied to test the versatility of the model in learning of temporal relationships that exist
within both short and long sequences. We use only the Ti and Vi data for training and
validation respectively as they are free of anomalies. Given F as the set of all the features
in the OS kernel-level traces of an application, FN ⊆ F and FA ⊆ F are valid where FN
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and FA refer to the set of the features of the normal and anomalous sequences respectively.
Also, FN ∩ FA 6= ∅, hence our choice of using the closed-world model which removes the
strong assumption that the available atypical traces capture all the possible anomalies that
can be present in the process.
The validation errors are passed to the error estimator block to fit a kde. The kde kernel
generates the probability density function ρN for the normal sequence error value and ρA
for the anomalous sequence error values. We settle for using the error values to reduce the
incidents of false positives and false negatives as we are interested in understanding the
profile of the application over time and not just instant future event prediction. This idea is
premised on the belief that a single kernel event error can hardly affect the performance of
the process or application but a couple of wrong or illegal kernel events over time can form
a payload which can be used to wreak damage on the application. With the high number
of anomalous samples as seen in Table 4.1, we use the ρ values of Vi and a fraction of the ρ
values from the Ai to train the KNN algorithm in the anomaly detection block of Fig. 3.6.
We determine the optimal number of neighbors by performing k-fold cross-validation on the
ρ values. k is 5 in all our experiments. To demonstrate the efficacy of this method, we show
the decision boundaries set by the Fβ minimization function and that of the KNN model
in Fig. 5.11 and Fig. 5.12 respectively for the sporadic scenario sequences. As evident from
Fig. 5.11, Fβ threshold has more false positives and negatives when compared to Fig. 5.12
because of the True or False binary approach.
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4.5 An Ensemble Deep Recursive Attentive Anomaly
Detection Framework Experiments
The experiment for this anomaly framework uses the Dataset II [28] since it is the only
benchmark dataset that possess all the attributes required for the ensemble framework of
Section 3.5. This experiment uses an in-house customized version of the UAV physics of
the West Virginia University (WVU) Atlas project. There are four main blocks in the
simulation: UAV Physics and Controller, Bochs Virtual Machine (VM), Instrumentation
Script and SYSCALL Database. These four blocks are inside one docker container as shown
in Fig. 4.1. The instrumentation script starts and ends the simulation when the FlightBegin
and FlightEnd commands are issued respectively. The script communicates with the UAV
controller via a serial interface and dumps captured system calls along with their system
call arguments in the SYSCALL Database. POSIX IPC creates an interface between the
Instrumentation script and the Bochs VM, which is a CPU emulator. The physics of the
UAV simulates: a) three throttles of the X-axis, the Y-axis, and the Z-axis, b) gravity
of 9.81m/s2, and c) aerodynamic drag. The UAV controller application has four states
captured in Fig. 4.2, and these are explained as follows:
a) Take Off : Apply the Z-axis throttle until we attain cruising height.
b) Cruising : Adjust Z-axis throttle to counteract gravity, and set the X-axis and Y-axis
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throttles to move at a uniform velocity to the destination.
c) Landing : Turn off X-axis and Y-axis throttles, and lower the Z-axis throttle to ensure
a smooth landing of the UAV.
d) Landed : The UAV reaches the ground and the instrumentation script exits.
As our anomaly frameworks are scenario driven as highlighted in Section 3.5.1, we highlight
the different scenarios which we simulated in Section 4.2.2.
4.6 Anomaly Detection Framework using CGAN
Experiments
The experiments for the AD-CGAN uses the ALOI and the KDD99 dataset since none of
the other datasets has labels and cannot be used for supervised learning.
4.6.1 Dataset III (ALOI) Experiments
Dataset III (ALOI) Single Class CGAN
As highlighted in Section 3.6.2, the aim of the single class CGAN is to understand the profile
of the data being trained such that when the fake and the real samples are subjected to the
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embedding algorithm, the result should be a single cluster which confirms how the single
class CGAN has been able to understand the underlying distribution of the real samples. To
measure the performance of the single class generator, Gs, we take snapshots of the model
at intervals of 50 epochs during training. Thereafter, we compare the generated quality at
each snapshot and the best model becomes our trained generator model. According to [77],
the tSNE algorithm used for the embedding of Section 3.6.2 has a hyperparameter called
perplexity3, therefore, we generate the results under different perplexities to measure the
stability of the model under varying perplexities. In Fig. 4.3, the fake and real samples
show two distinct clusters under different perplexities before we train the generator. After
we are done training the generator, we can see that the generator is able to decipher the
underlying distribution of the real samples as seen in Fig. 4.4 where the real and fake
samples form one cluster. The ability of the single class Gs to generate samples which are
indistinguishable from the real samples confirms one of our hypothesis that we can use the
Gs to augment the minority class data samples and train the binary class CGAN generator,
Gb with a balanced dataset.
Dataset III (ALOI) Binary Class CGAN
The binary class CGAN takes input training data from both the original and augmented
samples generated from the single class generator, Gs, with the aim of producing the reverse


































Figure 4.3: Before Training (ALOI): Real and Fake Samples of theGs form 2 Clusters
behavioral expectation of the single class CGAN. As the name suggests, the binary class
CGAN aims to understand the underlying distributions of both the malicious and normal


































Figure 4.4: After Training (ALOI): Real and Fake Samples of the Gs form 1 Cluster
same cluster when subjected to the embedding algorithm and the decision functions of
Section 3.6.2. As seen in Fig. 4.5, the embedding output before training shows a mixture
of the positive and negative class in the same cluster, thereby creating both false positive
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and false negative situation on both the real and fake samples. In all our result analysis, we
designate the malicious samples as the positive class. In Fig. 4.6, the results of the trained
model show how the Gb output and real test samples have successfully been separated
into their respective classes. Although the snapshots of Fig. 4.6 does not show exactly two
clusters as hypothesized, from the position of the fake normal and fake malicious data, we
see that when we compute the centroids using (3.37), the closest samples are data points
that belong to the same class from the test points. Thereby, confirming our hypothesis that
the generator can be used to understand the different latent class distributions. And that
an embedding of the fake and the real samples of each class should produce a single cluster
that aims to classify samples from that particular class with a higher precision. Also, since
the malicious class is our positive class, we can see from Fig. 4.6 that the malicious class
forms a single cluster as hypothesized, and this result reduces the chance of false negative
to almost zero as shown in Table 5.9 and Fig. 5.25. In Table 5.9, we show the different
classification metric of the ALOI dataset alongside the total number of test samples for
each class. The malicious class test sample consists of the real and fake samples from the
single class CGAN. The perplexity hyperparameter that we use for this testing is 150, and
we sample 500 samples of the test data at a time. While the Gb generates samples during
testing, the test report evaluates the performance of the framework on the real input test
samples only. The fake samples generated by the Gb during testing controls the position of






















































Figure 4.5: Before Training (ALOI): Benign and Malicious Classes form Mixed Clus-
ters
different algorithms on the most commonly used anomaly datasets. We compare the results
of some algorithms used in [8] on the ALOI dataset to the results of AD-CGAN in Table 5.10.






















































Figure 4.6: After Training (ALOI): Benign and Malicious Classes form Distinct Clus-
ters
be comparing with clustering algorithms results on the normalized, duplicate results of the
ALOI dataset in [8]. Also, [8] did evaluation using different hyperparameters on the same
algorithm but we report only the one with the highest receiver operating characteristics
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area under the curve (ROC AUC) value.
4.6.2 Dataset IV (KDD99) Experiment
One of the strengths of AD-CGAN which we highlight in this test is the ability of the
framework to train on a small subset of the data and still generalize well on the rest of the
test data. Traditional machine learning algorithms train on a larger portion of the data and
usually reserve between 10%−20% of the data for evaluation and testing. However, in the
AD-CGAN framework, we show that we can relax this convention and still achieve great
results. TheGb is able to generalize even when trained on a small subset of the data because
CGANs have inherent ability to draw knowledge from the latent space distribution of the
data used for training. Instead of training on the whole dataset, we train on a balanced
subset of the data comprising of 772781 samples from the normal profile and 772781 from
the malicious profile. This training sample represents 31.55% of the whole dataset, and
this percentage contrasts with the normal convention of training on larger subsets of the
data. We sample the test data from the remaining subsets of the data. Since our model
depends on the perplexity parameter of the embedding layer, we used hyperparamter tuning
to determine the optimum perplexity. For our evaluations on KDD99 dataset, we use 120 as
the perplexity parameter, and we sample a batch of 300 test samples at a time. Therefore,
in Fig. 4.7, the real and fake samples of both the normal and malicious profiles form several
























































Figure 4.8: After Training (KDD99): Benign and Malicious Classes form Distinct
Clusters
125
trained Gb. Furthermore, in Fig. 4.8, the real and fake samples of the normal profile class
form a single, distinct cluster while the real and fake samples of the malicious profile class
form a separate, distinct cluster after training the Gb. This contrast in the behavior of the
generator after training confirms our hypothesis that the CGANs can be used to learn the
context of the data, and form the basis for anomaly detection.
4.7 Distributed Algorithm for Anomaly Detection
Tasks in Edge Computing Experiments
We setup an experiment with 10 nodes that can go on and off the network at anytime. The
nodes are of diverse compute capacities ranging from personal computers to Raspberry Pi.
Some nodes have a continuous stream of tasks while other nodes have tasks that are emitted
intermittently or randomly. In each of the devices, we select the processes to be monitored
and the higher the number of processes monitored, the higher the load on the CPU. The
tasks are mixture of high and low priority segments where priority is determined by the
latency requirement of the task segment. Our experimental objectives are: a) determine
the throughput (task completion time) of tasks in an independent node as the CPU load
varies and use that as the baseline. b) determine the throughput of nodes when the nodes
in a Wi-Fi form an ad-hoc network and use the offloading algorithm for managing task
distribution. We start the access point node since it provides the interface for networking
126
and we then start the devices. For the purpose of the simulation, the access point node
notifies each node to disconnect when 2 million tasks have been completed and we show
the statistics in Section 5.6. The nodes stream data logged from many processes (normal
and anomalous) of an unmanned area vehicle application to imitate individual applications
in a node.
4.8 Summary
This chapter presents the different experimental scenarios to verify the performance of the
various contributions in this thesis concerning our objectives. Therefore, we discuss the





In this chapter, we organize the results of the experiments in Chapter 4 according to their
corresponding experiment names. Hence, there are five sections of the result discussion
corresponding to the five major contributions in Chapter 3.
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5.2 Anomaly Detection Framework using Event Dis-
tribution Analysis and Clustering Results
We test this anomaly detection framework on two different datasets with varying source
conditions. Dataset I [67] represents data from the field while Dataset II [28] is a simulated
data. In Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.3, we discuss the results of this framework on the
two datasets.



















































(b) Clusters of the Train/Anomalous Samples
Figure 5.2: Cluster Diagrams for the fifo-ls Experiment
5.2.1 Dataset I: No Missingness
Fig. 5.1 is the full dendrogram of the train and anomalous traces for the fifo-ls scenario,
and the two trace categories represent the standard and anomalous behavior of the system
respectively. The dendrogram discovered two significant clusters; therefore, we do further




































(b) Clusters of the Train/Anomalous Samples
Figure 5.3: Cluster Diagrams for the full-while Experiment
Leveraging the concept of dendrogram merging distance discussed in Section 3.3 as a simi-
larity measure, the three terminal clusters appear to be significantly different. The leftmost
(green) cluster and the rightmost (red) cluster seem to be significantly distinct from the





































(b) Clusters of the Train/Anomalous Samples
Figure 5.4: Cluster Diagrams for the hilRF-InFin Experiment
This split is seen by examining the sample index displayed on the horizontal axis where
the train traces which have index within {0, ...,68} are contained within the dense middle
cluster with a total of 69 traces. The anomalous traces with index within {69, ...,99}
corresponding to 31 traces are split between the leftmost (green) cluster and the rightmost
(red) cluster. This grouping matches the number of traces in each group of this fifo-ls
scenario as stated in Table 4.1.
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Figure 5.6: Truncated Dendrogram of the Normal and Delay Profiles
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Furthermore, as (3.8) is used to give a good measure of the quality of the clustering by
considering the distance between clusters, Fig. 5.1 does not provide much information other
than telling us the indices in a particular group. Therefore, we truncate the dendrogram by
showing only the last two or three merged clusters to make an informative decision about
the framework. In Fig. 5.2, we have provided a truncated version of Fig. 5.1 as well as
a truncated dendrogram of the train/clean traces with some annotation of the distances
to understand the similarity measure better. The x-axis in Fig. 5.2a and Fig. 5.2b gives
the number of samples merged in that particular branch while the annotation gives the
dendrogrammatic distance that is bridged to merge two clusters. This distance is equivalent
to the height of the horizontal line merging the clusters. Hence, the higher the horizontal
line joining them, the greater the dissimilarity between the merging clusters.
Consequently, we have displayed the last two clusters of the train/clean in Fig. 5.2a and
the last three clusters of Fig. 5.1 in Fig. 5.2b. The leftmost cluster in Fig. 5.2a is the clean
traces cluster while the train traces are contained in the rightmost cluster. The distance
between the right two clusters in Fig. 5.2b 1.48 and this threshold distance separates
the 31 anomalous traces from the normal 69 sample cluster. Curiously, 1.48 is greater
than the highest merging distance of 0.996 in Fig. 5.2a. Hence, with a threshold distance
sampled from {1.1, ...,1.4}, Fig. 5.2a is rightly labeled a one cluster dendrogram of the
clean and train traces while Fig. 5.2b correctly classifies the train (the 69 sample group)
and anomalous (21 and 10 sample clusters) traces. The exact number of samples in each
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category matches the numbers in Table 4.1 and the location of the sample index in Fig. 5.1
can be used to verify the accuracy of the clustering in Fig. 5.2b.
The traces in the scenario named full-while exhibit similar behavior as the ones in fifo-ls.
The only difference is the value of the maximum threshold distance. This difference in
threshold distance between scenarios is expected as the traces are generated under different
experimental conditions. Hence, there is a an anomaly framework classifier for each exper-
imental condition. The full-while scenario has {1.0, ...,1.15} as the cut-off distance band
because any value from this range is above the maximum cluster distance of 0.968 observed
in Fig. 5.3a but below the 1.22 merging distance in Fig. 5.3b. This distance classifies the
full-while traces in Fig. 5.3b into two distinct clusters with the right cluster (85 samples)
representing the normal traces and the left cluster (28 samples) being the anomalous traces.
The classifiers for the hilRF-InFin and sporadic scenarios follow the trend of the two scenar-
ios already discussed. The maximum threshold distance can vary within {1.20, ...,1.75}
and {1.20, ...,1.65} for the hilRF-InFin and sporadic classifiers respectively. Fig. 5.4 show
the discovered clusters and sample counts in the hilRF-InFin scenario.
5.2.2 Dataset I: Missingness
With an excellent result returned for the four profiles of [67]’s dataset, we analyzed the
conditions used to generate the dataset and hypothesized that since some of the profiles
involved changing the entire operating condition of the UAV controller application, the
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profiles’ divergence from the normal operating pattern may be so pronounced that both our
anomaly detection framework and that of [66]’s model produced excellent results on the
dataset. Therefore, we decided to produce, from the original dataset profiles, a perturbed
version of the data for each profile. Our view is that anomalies may occur as a subroutine
of the normal profile and that anomaly detection frameworks that perform well only on
an entirely different profile from the normal operating conditions may result in many false
negatives (allowing anomalous sequences to go undetected). Therefore, we inject missing
values in the data and after correcting for the missing values using overall mean imputation,
we test this anomaly framework again on the modified profiles to measure the accuracy of the
anomaly framework. The injection is done after each sample’s feature-distribution matrix
have been computed as shown in Fig. 3.4. Traversing each feature column, we draw a sample
from a random distribution and if its less than 1/10 or 1/5 depending on the percentage of
data we want to affect, we replace the feature-matrix value with 0. We vary the percentage
of the data to be affected by missingness from 10% to 20%. This variation of the affected
data size provides an opportunity for us to check the effect of diminishing normal sample
size on the accuracy of this anomaly detection framework. With missing values injected
into both the training and anomalous data, we create a scenario of weakened training data
and increased degree of attack vectors. To understand Table 5.1 very well, we have labeled
the anomalous and normal traces as POSITIVE and NEGATIVE classes respectively. As
shown in the results of Table 5.1, the anomaly framework recorded 100% TPR in all the
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Table 5.1: Anomaly Detection Framework Results on Dataset I with Missingness
Profile 10% Missing Value 20% Missing Value
TPR TNR TPR TNR
fifo-ls 100% 98.6% 100% 98.6%
full-while 100% 89.4% 100% 83.5%
hilRF-InFin 100% 100% 100% 100%
Sporadic 100% 100% 100% 100%
scenarios. The TNR is not 100% for fifo-ls and full-while profiles. The fifo-ls profile is
affected by both the missing values and the change in scheduling principle. Although we
have mixed results when we inject missingness, the anomaly framework did not record a
False Negative. For applications where it does not cost much to verify if a threat is real or
false, the false positive results can be tolerated. False positive is also milder than having a
false negative in the outcome. As expected, the results of the missigness show that as more
inconsistencies occur during the normal operating conditions, the accuracy of the anomaly
framework degrades. Also, the results confirm our hypothesis that perturbations within a
normal profile is more difficult to detect as it may be subtle or discernible depending on the
magnitude of the perturbation as seen in the fifo-ls and full-while profiles.
5.2.3 Dataset II
In this dataset, the normal behavior of the data has a negative class label, while any de-
viant behavior has positive class label. Observing Fig. 5.5, we can see that the dendrogram
clusters follow a similar pattern as the dataset I ’s clusters and produced two conspicuous
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clusters. The green cluster on the left of Fig. 5.5, show that the whole indices of the Delay
profile are grouped together in that cluster. Also, the red cluster on the right contains
the index that belong to the Normal profile. Furthermore, we generate a truncated dia-
gram in Fig. 5.6, which shows the two clusters separated to their different profiles with
a dendrogramatic distance of 2.46. The number of traces in each cluster of Fig. 5.6 also
corresponds to 43 and 10 for the Normal and Delay pattern, respectively. The performance
of the anomaly framework of Section 3.3 in this scenario can be attributed mostly to the
high-level instability introduced by the inability of the controller to read the value of the
sensors when it is under attack.























































Figure 5.8: Truncated Dendrogram of the Normal and Pseudo-Random Profiles
Therefore, in Fig. 5.7, we show the results of running the framework on the more complicated
Pseudo-Random profile. In this experiment, so many interesting observations about the
UAV control application was discovered as well as the revelation of the weaknesses of the
anomaly framework. On post-run examination of the Pseudo-Random profile, the attack
probability was active for the {44, ...,47} sub-sequences. Also, {82, ...,85} has positive
class label based on the probability value returned. In Fig. 5.7, the results appear fuzzy
until we truncated it to Fig. 5.8, and the results started to make sense. Using 0.031 as
the threshold value to demarcate the Normal and Pseudo-Random profiles, the following
observations are made:
y There is a 88.37% True Negative Rate (TNR) on the Normal profile as {0,1,2,3,38}
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samples are wrongly classified as false positives. The classification of index 0 as abnor-
mal is due to the instability associated with the startup of the UAV control application
before it stabilizes.
y There is a TPR of 90.70% on the Pseudo-Random profile as the {82, ...,85} sam-
ples are classified as False Negatives. With this False Negative Rate of 9.3%, we
compared the frequency of the sporadic attacks in the rightfully classified anomalous
sequences with that of the wrongly classified sequences, and we found that the abil-
ity of framework to detect the anomaly increases with the frequency of the sporadic
attacks. And since we were not controlling the frequency of the sporadic attacks in
each sub-sequence, the frequency was low in some sequences and high in others. This
is one of the weaknesses of this framework which we hope to addressed in Section 3.5.
y The sample index 48 was classified as anomalous even though we did not perform
attack in this sub-sequence. We investigated this sample further to understand if it
was a misclassification or whether it actually had anomalies. We found out that the
sequence diverges significantly from the normal profile which confirms the presence
of anomaly. Furthermore, on realizing that the {44, ...,47} all had the sporadic
attacks, we found that the sample 48 diverged from the normal profile due to what
we term the residual effects of the attacks on the preceding sub-sequences that was
so pronounced that it was captured by the anomaly framework. This again was an
interesting insight for us as this framework shows us that the effects of anomalies do
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Table 5.2: Anomaly Detection Framework Results on Dataset II
Normal Profile vs Delay Profile Normal vs Pseudo-Random Profile
Normal Delay Normal Pseudo-Random
TNR FPR TPR FNR TNR FPR TPR FNR
100% 0% 100% 0% 88.37% 11.62% 90.70% 9.30%
not stop abruptly when the attack stops since it has messed with the scheduling of
events in the kernel.
In all, the Pseudo-Random profile corroborates the strengths of this anomaly detection
framework we hypothesized, and exposed the weaknesses of the framework too.
The authors of [26] utilize the dataset of [28] for model verification but the research goals
are different from ours; hence we cannot make a comparison of framework performance since
[26] uses neural network-based regression and classification models to predict instruction
counter and classify individual system calls1 respectively. On the other hand, this anomaly
framework classifies traces made up of thousands of system call events.
5.2.4 Accuracy and Benchmark: Dataset I
We compare our results with that reported in [66] regarding accuracy as they have used
the [67] dataset for model verification. The performance of this anomaly framework as
compared with that of [66] regarding ( tpr) and false positive rate ( fpr) is displayed in
Table 5.3. As can be seen from Table 5.3, our anomaly framework can classify both the
1The authors of [24] did not make trace classification
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Table 5.3: Comparison of the Cluster-based Anomaly Framework with that of [66]
on Dataset I
Scenario [66] ’s Model Cluster-based Anomaly Framework
TPR FPR TPR FPR
fifo-ls 94% 0% 100% 0%
sporadic 97% 0% 100% 0%
full-while 100% 0% 100% 0%
hilRf 100% 0% 100% 0%
normal and anomalous traces correctly in the dataset for the whole scenarios. Comparison
based on runtime is hard because there is no uniform format for the traces, and publicly
available benchmark dataset and model in this domain are rare. We run all our experiments
on a x64-based laptop with 8GB physical memory, Intel i5-2 core processors clocking
at 2.3GHz. To measure the processing time complexity, we time how long it took to
return the dendrogramatic distance of each trace in a particular scenario starting from
feature extraction in the traces. The traces have 50000 events each, and the scenario with
the maximum number (124) of traces is the full-while. And it took the full-while model
16.22µs to return the dendrogramatic distances of each of the traces which confirms that
this approach is computationally light.
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5.3 Deep Recursive Attentive Anomaly Detection
Framework Results
We implement four different models corresponding to the different scenarios in the dataset
of [67] (Dataset I), and we run the experiments to generate the results in Table 5.4. The
decision boundaries of the four scenarios appear similar but for want of space, we show
that of the, full, sporadic and fifo decision boundaries in Figs. 5.9 and 5.10, Figs. 5.11
and 5.12 and Figs. 5.13 and 5.14 respectively. Using the anomaly detection sub-module of
these models, we generate the results for the accuracy of the frameworks and compare with
the same architecture using the base models that contains neither the attention layer nor
the recursive context input. The n of the last column represents the number of neighbors
used to make a detection decision in the anomaly detection module of the frameworks.
The anomalous sequences are tagged a Positive class and the normal sequences are tagged
a Negative class and the measure of closeness is the Minkowski distance metric. In the
Section 3.4 design, our goals are: a) achieve high recall notably for the positive class to
reduce false negative (FN) which may be harmful to the operation of the embedded system
especially the critical safety systems. b) mitigate false positive (FP) by achieving high
precision to avoid the resource consuming process of halting the operation of an embedded
system and investigating the FP.
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Figure 5.9: Decision Boundary by Fβ Minimization of the Full Profile
5.3.1 Base Framework vs Attention-based Framework
Early stopping and dynamic learning rate are used during training to control the number of
training epochs and improve the performance of the adam [47] optimization scheme that was
used during training. In Table 5.4, two patterns emerge: a) The attention-based framework
consistently outperforms the base model in every Φi. b) there is decreasing accuracy as we
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Figure 5.10: Decision Boundary by the KNN Model of the Full Profile
increase i in Φ. These patterns conform with our postulation that the attention layer and
the recursive input of the framework impact positively on the model performance. Also,
with a fixed input window, θin, the decreasing accuracy with increasing θout is expected as
the temporal information needed for longer sequence generation is restricted. nb
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Figure 5.11: Decision Boundary by Fβ Minimization of the Sporadic Profile
5.3.2 The Attention-Based Framework vs Other Anomaly
Frameworks
The authors of [66, 22, 23] have used the Dataset I for model validation. Although [66, 23]
models are offline-based models and do not take temporal relationships in the sequence
of events into account, we compare the framework of Section 3.4 with theirs as those are
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Figure 5.12: Decision Boundary by the KNN Model of the Sporadic Profile
the works we know targeting anomaly detection in a process via kernel-level trace analysis
that have used the same data for model validation. We also include the HAbAD model of
[23] in the comparison as this work builds on its architecture to reduce the high incidences
of the false positive rate recorded in the HAbAD model. Table 5.5 displays the true and
false positive rates from those works compared to the framework of Section 3.4. Unlike
the anomaly frameworks of [22, 66] that consider the full length of the trace anomalous
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Figure 5.13: Decision Boundary by Fβ Minimization of the Fifo Profile
if any part of the trace is anomalous, our anomaly framework presents the opportunity
of localizing the anomaly in a stream of events. However, for the sake of comparison, if
anomaly is detected in major parts of the trace of Table 4.1, we label the whole trace
as anomalous. But the major difference between our anomaly framework in Section 3.4
and the models of [66, 22] is in the length of the input sequence required to make an
inference. While [66, 22] require a long sequence of events observed over a span of time,
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Figure 5.14: Decision Boundary by the KNN Model of the Fifo Profile
our anomaly framework and HAbAD can take a short sequence of input as small as 10 and
make a prediction on whether it contains anomalies. As seen from Table 5.5, our anomaly
framework outperforms the [66]’s model regarding the true positive rate. However, [22]’s
sporadic model beat the true positive rate of our anomaly framework. The true positive
rate is significant because the anomalies have a positive tag. With regards to the false
positive rate, the models of [66, 22] perform better obviously because it requires a longer
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Table 5.4: Attention-Based vs Base Framework Comparison
Experiment Models Lookahead Window Accuracy n
Φ1 Φ5 Φ10
fifo
Base 0.794 0.746 0.724 19
Attention-Based 0.981 0.972 0.947 19
full
Base 0.836 0.791 0.767 7
Attention-Based 0.99 0.942 0.916 7
hilrf
Base 0.870 0.815 0.778 9
Attention-Based 0.968 0.937 0.908 9
sporadic
Base 0.790 0.772 0.728 11
Attention-Based 0.916 0.872 0.857 11
sequence to make an inference. However, this requirement for long input sequences limits
the application of these [66, 22] models to offline anomaly detection. Furthermore, while
[66, 22] frameworks use quantitative variance as their underlying principle, our anomaly
framework uses the temporal ordering of the sequences as the underlying marker which
means that our framework and that of [66, 22] target two different types of anomalies in the
process. Finally, our anomaly framework reduces the strain put on the embedded storage
by consuming the sequences as they are streamed from the instrumented kernel but the
models of [66, 22] require a system with high capacity storage that can store the traces for
offline processing. Our anomaly framework also has the advantage of deciding on both long
and short sequences without seeing the complete sequence, e.g. if an anomaly requires 100
timesteps to execute the anomalous payload, this framework requires as little as 5 − 10
timesteps to detect that there is an anomaly in the application while the frameworks of
[66, 22] require traces comparable in length to the training sequences to make an inference.
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Also, from Table 5.5, we can see the impact of the improvement in the architecture between
our anomaly framework and HAbAD as manifest in their false positive rate numbers. We
set out primarily to reduce the incidents of the false positives with a modification in the
architecture of HAbAD because it takes time and resources to investigate a false positive
especially in a critical infrastructure. We are able to improve the false positive rate by
25% ,50%, and 71% in the full, fifo, and sporadic scenarios respectively.
Table 5.5: Comparison of our Anomaly Detection Framework with that of [66, 22, 23]
Model [66]’s Framework [22]’s Framework [23]’s HAbAD Ensemble Fram.
TPR FPR TPR FPR TPR FPR TPR FPR
fifo 94% 0% 100% 0% 100% 4% 100% 2%
spora. 97% 0% 100% 0% 99% 21% 99% 6%
full 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 4% 100% 3%
hilrf 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0%
5.3.3 Model Complexity Analysis
Bearing in mind that the model can run both online and offline, we analyze the complexity
of this anomaly framework concerning space and time. This anomaly framework consists
of two components which are the unsupervised recurrent neural network predictor and the
supervised clustering classifier. Our test platform is a personal computer with four logical
processors running Intel Core i5-6200U CPU clocked at 2.3GHz and 2.4Ghz on two
cores. The complete model parameters and architecture require about 2.1Mb storage and
the personal computer has a primary memory capacity of 8GB. As for time complexity, we
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time the running of the framework from the unsupervised predictor to the error estimator
and KNN classifier. The longest input length we test is 10, and it took the predictor an
average of 3milliseconds to make the prediction. The non-parametric kernel estimator
took about 7nanoseceonds to generate the probability density and the KNN classifier
takes an average of 0.1millisececonds to make an anomaly decision. Overall, the end-
to-end inference time for this framework on this platform is about 3.107milliseconds.
5.4 An Ensemble Deep Recursive Attentive Anomaly
Detection Framework Results
























Figure 5.15: Normal Profile System Call Prediction Accuracy
We have broken down the results analysis into two subsections to reflect the outputs of the
time-driven and event-driven models. In each of the categories, the normal profile serves
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Figure 5.16: Normal Profile IC Count Prediction Accuracy






















Figure 5.17: Random Profile System Call Prediction Accuracy
as the baseline since it has no known anomalies.
5.4.1 Time-Driven Model
The time-driven pool is a MIMO model that predicts both categorical and continuous
values. The inputs are (3.19), (3.20), and (3.22). And the two outputs are the upcoming
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Figure 5.18: Random Profile IC Count Prediction Accuracy






















Figure 5.19: Delay Profile System Call Prediction Accuracy
system call categories and the expected IC count of the system calls. Instead of feeding all
the inputs as a multivariate input, we created parallel input lines because of the nature of the
inputs. The input of (3.20) are categorical values which necessitated our use of embedding
layer to perform vector encoding while that of (3.22) and (3.19) are continuous variables.
Hence, feeding all of them as a single multivariate input is not a good design option. Also,
creating a single multivariate output was not feasible because the outputs are categorical and
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Figure 5.20: Delay Profile IC Count Prediction Accuracy
continuous variables for the system call and timestamp respectively. The prediction error
is computed differently for the two outputs. The categorical output prediction accuracy
is the summation of the prediction instances where the prediction outcome matches the
target category within a prediction window, Wout, as given in (3.26). On the other hand,
the average of the absolute error between the predicted and the actual value of the number
of IC required by the system call instance is used for the continuous variable output within
a Wout and this is given in (3.27). In our experiment, the ratio of the input window, Win
to the output window, Wout is always greater than 1. The error values from the validation
dataset of the normal profile is used to compute the sample mean and variance which is used
in (3.30) to calculate the probability of outputs within a window containing an anomaly.
According to (3.30), the lesser the probability, the higher the influence of anomalies within
that prediction window. We used a window instead of an instant-to-instant comparison of
output because we realize that a single malicious system call in isolation can rarely cause
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Table 5.6: Complexity of the Ensemble Framework
Name Win Wout Parameter weight Inference time
Time-Driven 15 5 2.08MB CPU: 453µs Wall: 255µs
Event-Driven 330 330 2.95MB CPU: 29.9ms Wall: 16.8ms
damage in a process behavior but a sustained and closely occurring malicious prediction is
an indication of a context anomaly in the process.




















Figure 5.21: Syscall Error for the Normal, Pseudo-Random and Delay Profiles


























Figure 5.22: IC Error for the Normal, Pseudo-Random and Delay Profiles
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Table 5.7: Event-Driven Model Performance Metrics
Profile Name Total Tested No. of Traces TNR FPR TPR FNR
Normal 436615 43661 4 100% 0 N/A N/A
Pseudo-Random 434310 434304 43 N/A N/A 87.5% 12.5%
Delay 100964 100958 10 N/A N/A 90% 10%
Baseline
To verify how the event-driven performs concerning our first objective in Section 3.4.1, we
have shown a snapshot of the prediction accuracy of the model on the normal profile test
data for both the system call and IC count prediction at Fig. 5.15 and Fig. 5.16 respectively.
The aim of this section is to test the ability of the anomaly framework to learn the normal
operating profile of the UAV controller application. The snapshots in Fig. 5.15 and Fig. 5.16
show how closely our model generalizes to the normal profile operating condition and having
satisfied our first objective; this becomes our basis for discriminating between normal and
malicious process contexts.
Anomalous Tests
Fig. 5.17 and Fig. 5.18 are the prediction accuracy for the random profile while Fig. 5.19
and Fig. 5.20 represent the prediction accuracy of the framework on the delay profiles data.
It should be emphasized that the system call accuracy values are categorical (representing
one of the possible system calls in linux ), hence, it is a boolean measure.
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Figure 5.23: System Call Anomaly Level Probability, ALρ for Pseudo-Random and
Delay Profiles
























Random ALρ Delay ALρ
Figure 5.24: IC Count Anomaly Level Probability, ALρ for the Pseudo-Random
and Delay Profiles
Using the information from Fig. 5.15 and Fig. 5.16 for the normal profile, Fig. 5.17 and
Fig. 5.18 for the pseudo-random profile, and Fig. 5.19 and Fig. 5.20 for the delay profile,
we compute the error, d generated from the prediction for each of the profiles and we
plot the results in Fig. 5.21 and Fig. 5.22 for the system call and IC count prediction
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error respectively. From Fig. 5.21 and Fig. 5.22, we can observe that the error values for
the normal profile, dnormal is always less than or equal to 1 which is an indication that
(d − µ)2 ≤ 1, and this condition trivializes (3.30), and proves that most of the normal
profile events contain no anomalies. Since the anomalies we inject as explained in Section
4.5 are applied within a brief duration, it makes sense to see that the error values for both
the pseudo-random and delay profiles sometimes are within the non anomalous error range.
The significant difference in the error values of Fig. 5.21 and Fig. 5.22 satisfies our second
objective of Section 3.4.1. Also, we set out to investigate the propagation effect of these
anomalies, and as can be observed in both Fig. 5.21 and Fig. 5.22, it is obvious that a
brief injection of an anomaly can have a propagation of error/fault effect which outlives the
duration of the actual anomalous action. In our experiment, during the delay profile, we
observed that a brief clock signal manipulation affected the scheduler heavily to the extent
that the UAV could not recover even when we stop the attack, and this caused the UAV
to crash. This propagation of error/fault effect for the pseudo-random and delay profiles
are conspicuous in both Fig. 5.21 and Fig. 5.22. Another interesting observation is the
relationship between both outputs. In most steps for the snapshots shown in Fig. 5.21 and
Fig. 5.22, when the system call output error is high, the IC count error is high too, but
they may not be in the same ALρ band.
Furthermore, we pass the error value from the stream of events to the anomaly detection
block of Section 3.5.2, and based on the value of the ALρ returned, we determine if there
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is an anomaly in that window of the stream. If there is an anomaly present, we assign it
an anomaly level to indicate the severity (which is a measure of errors detected within the
prediction window). In our model, we have four levels of ALρ, and the higher the value
of the ALρ, the lesser the severity of the anomaly as captured by (3.30). ALρ ≥ 1 is
the special case when (d− µ)2 ≤ 1, and since probability cannot be greater than 1, this
scenario affirms that there is no anomaly and is not assigned any level. Hence, this scenario
depicts the standard operating context of the process.
ALρ =

AL1 ρ < 0.25
AL2 0.25 ≤ ρ < 0.5
AL3 0.5 ≤ ρ < 0.75
AL4 0.75 ≤ ρ < 1
(5.1)
Therefore, we present the ALρ as a piece-wise function in (5.1). These ALρ are illustrated
in Fig. 5.23 and Fig. 5.24 for the system call and IC count prediction ALρ respectively
while ρ is the probability computed by (3.30).
Performance Metrics
In our experiment, we kept track of the window in which an anomaly was injected but we
did not keep track of the exact instants within a window that it runs. This is because
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Table 5.8: Time-Driven Model Performance Metrics
Name Total Tests Errors (wout = 5) Syscall ALρ IC ALρ
Normal 436615 43661 8732 969 706
Pseudo-Random 434310 434304 86860 455 534
Delay 100964 100958 20191 20050 5794
we understand that effects of anomalies can linger beyond when the attack stopped, and
it would have been untenable to assume that the effects of anomalous injection can stop
at an instant. Therefore, we cannot give an exact number of anomalies present but we
know the windows in which anomalies exist. As seen from Table 5.8, the time-driven model
reported 969 and 706 false positives for the syscall event and IC anomaly level probability
respectively, mostly from system events generated during the take-off and landing insta-
bility. The false positives are 11.09% and 8.08% for the system call events, and the IC
count ALρ respectively. Also, looking at the ALρ numbers for both the pseudo-random
and delay profiles, we observe that the numbers are not the same, and this confirms our
hypothesis that the effect of the attacks on either of the output channels depends on the
type of attack injected into the application. Also, the variation in the number of anomalies
captured by the two output channels confirms our hypothesis in Section 3.5.2 that single
output frameworks that aims to detect anomalies in the system call event output might miss
anomalies aimed at the execution cycle count feature of the system calls and vice-versa. The
delay profile attack affects the system call event sequence more because it creates fictitious
computationally intensive tasks that generate events that affected the order and type of
system calls. In a window where the probability indicated that an anomaly was not run
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but we observed an ALρ in that window, we label that a false positive. For the pseudo-
random profile, there were a total of u 13% false system call event ALρs and 18.2% false
instruction cycle count ALρs. Expectedly, the delay profile has a lesser false alarm since
the attack was non-stealthy and was increasing exponentially. The exact number of false
positives are 9.6% and 7.9% for the system call event and the IC count respectively.
5.4.2 Event-Driven Model
To detect deviations which has a long profile (spans over thousands of events), we use the
event-driven model to monitor the distribution of the system calls events within a window of
observation. Each window of observation is called a trace, and each trace has 10000 events
corresponding to the same window used for the experiments in Section 4.2.2. Therefore, it
takes as input, the SRFin at time, t and predicts SRFout at time, t+δt where δt = 1/FED
and FED remains the frequency of operation of the event-driven model which is far less
than FTD. This transformation results in 4 normal profile traces for testing, 43 pseudo-
random profile traces, and 10 delay profile traces. As seen from Table 5.7, there is no false
positive on the normal profile test traces. In the pseudo-random profile, a total of 8 traces
has anomalies, and 87.5% of the anomalous traces was flagged. In the delay profile, the
anomalies progressively increased in intensity until the UAV crashed. Therefore, all the
traces contain anomalies and the event-driven model was able to flag 90% of the traces.
Without complementing the time-driven model with the event-driven model, anomalies with
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long profile will be missed since the effect within a short span monitored by the time-driven
model may not be significant for it to be captured by the time-driven model.
5.4.3 Complexity of the Framework
Running the framework on a multi-core personal computer with 8GB of RAM and Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-6200 CPU @2.3GHz, we use a Python timing library to obtain the inference
time of the time and event-driven models in both the CPU and Wall clock times as shown
in Table 5.6. As seen from the table, the event-driven model has a longer inference time
because of the dimension of both the input and the output. It also has to process up to
10000 events into a 330 relative frequency feature set and this adds to the inference time.
From Table 5.6, the inference time returned by these models are suitable for any online
anomaly detection applications.
As stated in Section 3.5, FTD/FED < 1 represents the frequency of computation of the
two models where FTD and FED represents the time-driven and event-driven models re-
spectively. Since the time-driven model targets changing fast-profiles and the event-driven
model targets varying slow-profiles, the longer inference time of the event-driven model does
not impact the system negatively as its frequency of operation is far lower than that of the
time-driven model.
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5.5 Anomaly Detection Framework using CGAN
Results
In the following sub-sections, we discuss the performance of AD-CGAN on datasets III and
IV.
5.5.1 AD-CGAN Performance on Datasets III and IV
In Table 5.9, we show the metrics of the AD-CGAN when tested on the dataset III (ALOI)
and dataset IV (KDD99). In the dataset III, we sample randomly from both the augmented
data from the single class CGAN generator, Gs and the original anomalous data.
Table 5.9: Performance of AD-CGAN on the ALOI and KDD99 Dataset
Dataset Class Precision Recall F1 Score Test Samples Accuracy
ALOI
Normal 0.96945 0.98905 0.97915 10044
0.97885
Malicious 0.98872 0.96856 0.97854 9956
KDD99
Normal 0.77749 0.99862 0.87429 74886
0.85663
Malicious 0.99809 0.71507 0.83320 75114
The number of data samples tested is included in Table 5.9 and we can see that with
20000 data samples tested, the accuracy of the framework and other metrics show effective
detection of malicious samples with almost zero false positives. We attribute the ability
of the AD-CGAN to achieve this level of performance on the false positive metric on the
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inherent nature of AD-CGAN to use the latent knowledge of the distribution of the data to
reduce the effect of noise during inference. Since the positive class is our malicious profile
data, the data of Table 5.9 confirms the effectiveness of AD-CGAN on the dataset III as it
reports high precision and recall on both classes of data. Similarly, in Table 5.9, we report
the class-based metrics for the KDD99 dataset as tested on 150000 samples of the test
data. As seen from Table 5.9, for 150000 samples of the test data, the precision score of
the malicious profile achieves one of our objectives of reducing false positives while ensuring
that we detect the malicious profiles in the system. This high precision score ensures that
while we detect the actual malicious profiles, we do not invest resources to investigate false
alarms.
5.5.2 AD-CGAN Versus Non-GAN-Based Methods
Furthermore, in Table 5.10, we compare the performance of AD-CGAN on the ALOI dataset
with other cluster-based algorithms that have been used on the data. We report only the
normalized, duplicate and the normalized, duplicate, 1-of-n encoding versions of the ALOI
and KDD99 dataset experiments respectively from [8] because we took similar preprocessing
steps. We select the average precision, maximum F-1 score, and the ROC AUC score for
comparison because those are the common metrics reported in [8]. From the results in Table
5.10 under the ALOI dataset category, AD-CGAN outperforms all the other algorithms in
all the metrics reported. Although the authors in [8] trained and tested on a very small
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subset of the dataset IV of about 60839 while we train and test on the full dataset of
about 4,898,431 samples, we compare the performance of AD-CGAN because while some
metrics like ROC AUC may vary with sample size and class imbalance, some others like
accuracy, precision, recall is expected to be stable irrespective of the sample size for a well
designed anomaly framework. Therefore, in Table 5.10, we compare the results of other
clustering-based algorithms as reported in [8] to AD-CGAN. While the KNN algorithm
has a better ROC AUC score, AD-CGAN outperforms all other algorithms in the average
precision and F-1 scores. Since the ROC AUC are a function of sample size and class
balance, we posit that the high ROC AUC score of KNN on KDD99 dataset is because
of the small sample of data that it was trained and tested on. In Fig. 5.25, we plot the
ROC curves for the ALOI and KDD99 datasets with the malicious profiles designated as the
positive class. The curves show that AD-CGAN has high precision for the malicious profiles
of both data but the confidence in the KDD99 dataset is lower than in that of the ALOI
dataset. This behavior is expected because the KDD99 test dataset has some anomalous
types that are not present in the training sample. Therefore, even though AD-CGAN is
able to detect these profiles with high precision, the true positive rate will not be the same
when compared with dataset that has similar profile types in both the test and training
samples.
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Figure 5.25: ROC Curve for the ALOI and KDD99 Dataset
5.5.3 AD-CGAN Versus GAN/Non-GAN Derived Methods
on Dataset IV
In Table 5.11, we compare the performance of AD-CGAN to other methods, including
those that implement variants of GAN-based anomaly detection frameworks. We report
the PCA performance again in Table 5.11 since the report in Table 5.10 does not use the
full dataset and is also older than that of the report in Table 5.11. FB in Table 5.11 refers to
feature bagging, while AE refers to generic autoencoder where reconstruction error is used
to generate anomaly scores. DSEBM of Table 5.11 refers to the Deep Structured Energy-
Based Models for Anomaly Detection developed by the authors of [86]. These models serve
as the baseline for the non-GAN-based approaches while using the EGAN, AnoGAN, and
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Table 5.10: AD-CGAN vs non-GAN-based Models on the Datasets III and IV
Dataset Algorithm k Precision F-1 Score AUC Score
ALOI
KNN 1 0.13019 0.17982 0.74141
KNNW 1 0.14090 0.18164 0.74862
LOF 9 0.11933 0.19791 0.78437
SimplifiedLOF 9 0.13114 0.21236 0.79755
LoOP 12 0.14852 0.23272 0.80243
ODIN 12 0.15644 0.24430 0.80608
KDEOS 98 0.09264 0.15412 0.77409
LDF 9 0.08717 0.14766 0.74790
INFLO 9 0.13931 0.22596 0.80020
COF 13 0.14095 0.21083 0.80353
AD-CGAN N/A 0.97909 0.97885 0.9832
KDD
KNN 85 0.36786 0.48159 0.98982
KNNW 100 0.11989 0.23577 0.98273
LOF 100 0.01091 0.03139 0.82330
SimplifiedLOF 34 0.00966 0.04012 0.62814
LoOP 34 0.01445 0.06088 0.68726
ODIN 100 0.01327 0.04944 0.78924
KDEOS 50 0.01130 0.05336 0.61999
LDF 87 0.02674 0.06834 0.88959
INFLO 25 0.01095 0.05044 0.64848
COF 35 0.01278 0.06275 0.61605
AD-CGAN N/A 0.88796 0.85372 0.89300
MAD-GAN for comparison in the GAN-based methods. The data for the algorithms and
methods in Table 5.11 are taken from [51] and [85], which were published in 2019 and 2018
respectively.
In all the non-GAN-based models, AD-CGAN performs better than all of the models in
all the three key metrics of Precision, Recall and F-1 Score. For the GAN-derived models,
AD-CGAN outperforms the AnoGAN in all the three metrics reported in Table 5.11. While
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Table 5.11: AD-CGAN Versus GAN-Derived/Non-GAN-Derived Approaches on
Dataset IV
Dataset Models Precision Recall F-1 Score
KDD
PCA 60.66 37.69 0.47
KNN 45.51 18.98 0.53
FB 48.98 19.36 0.23
AE 80.59 42.36 0.55
DSEBM 86.19 64.46 0.74
AnoGAN 87.86 82.97 0.85
EGAN 92.00 95.82 0.94
MAD-GAN* 94.92 19.14 0.32
MAD-GAN** 81.58 96.33 0.88
MAD-GAN*** 86.91 94.79 0.90
AD-CGAN 88.80 85.37 0.89
EGAN performs better than AD-CGAN in this dataset, the use of an additional module
called an Encoder in addition to the generator and discriminator during inference makes
this model computationally complex when compared to AD-CGAN, which uses only the
generator for inference and does not involve the computationally expensive process of input
sample inversion to latent space during inference. We report results for three versions of
MAD-GAN with each corresponding to the best result of the model in one of Precision,
Recall, or F-1 Score. One obvious observation from the report is model inference instability
as the results of the Precision, Recall, and F-1 Score vary in each run. We posit that this
variability in inference output is caused by information loss during the computationally
expensive process of input inversion during inference. Unlike these GAN-derived models
that use either an encoder or input sample inversion strategy during inference, AD-CGAN
smartly avoids all these approaches by using theGb to produce centroids in two-dimensional
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space for both the anomalous and benign samples during inference and quickly produces
anomaly score for each sample projected into the same two-dimensional space as that of
the outputs of the generator, Gb. Hence, while some metrics of MAD-GAN are better in
some models, AD-CGAN generates inference outputs that are consistent and does not rely
on any heuristics.
5.6 Non-Distributed vs Distributed Tasks
We set the tasks to varying degrees of latency requirements up to 100 milliseconds, and we
stop the simulation after 2 million tasks have been analyzed. In Fig. 5.26, we have plotted
the percentage of stale (anomaly detection tasks that could not finish before their timing
constraint) for both the standalone (where each node works independently) situation and the
distributed scenario utilizing the offloading algorithm under varying CPU load conditions.
Comparing Fig. 5.26a and Fig. 5.26b, the latter consistently outperforms the former under
the various CPU load conditions except in the Random CPU load category. Under the
Random CPU load category, we allowed the CPU load utilization to fluctuate between the
minimum (idle) and maximum (full) value. The result in this category under distributed
mode is poor as we observed that bursty traffic by most of the nodes at the same time
with short latency requirements made it difficult for the scheduling algorithm to manage
the tasks optimally, hence the poor result in this category. The high stale tasks in the Low
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Figure 5.26: Distributed vs Non Distributed Anomaly Detection Tasks Comparison
and Moderate CPU load categories in Fig. 5.26a are mostly as a result of low capacity nodes
which cannot finish tasks within the time constraints. Under the High CPU load category,
because some nodes’ traffic are bursty in nature (reactive devices), the algorithm was able
to manage the anomaly tasks by utilizing the resources provided by these kind of devices
to ensure a high throughput.
5.7 Threats to Validity
We categorize the threats to validity into two areas: external, and internal.
y External
 OS Configurations: The anomaly frameworks in this thesis are tested with data
from Linux and QNX OSs processes. We understand that there are multiple
OSs, and we are not laying claim that these frameworks can process the raw
traces from every OS since each of them comes with a peculiar configuration.
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Therefore, the onus is on the user to ensure that the raw traces from these OSs
conform to the form expected by the framework both in parameter size and the
type of features.
 Data Drift : The anomaly frameworks developed in this thesis learn the behav-
ioral context of software applications and monitor deviations from typical con-
texts. Therefore, when there is software applications update, addition/removal
of modules in the software application or other upstream process changes, the
anomaly frameworks have to be updated accordingly via retraining of the model
weights. Thus, we recommend that the user monitors for input data drift to
ensure that the anomaly frameworks are making predictions on data from the
same profile that was used in training the frameworks.
y Internal
 Feature Space Restrictions: The anomalies targeted by each framework we de-
veloped in this thesis are peculiar, and so are the model’s input features. Since
these restrictions are necessary to create an explainable framework, the model
only works out-of-the-box if the user sticks to the same feature space used in
designing the anomaly framework.
 Compatibility : Although we used only open source tools in our framework devel-
opment, we are aware that these tools might have compatibility issues in some
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OSs. Therefore, the user should always check for compatibility of the tools used
in developing the anomaly frameworks with the deployment platform.
5.8 Framework Selection Guidelines
In all, we introduced four frameworks for anomaly detection. Since some frameworks are
either improving on the limitations of the other or solving an entirely different problem, we
highlight how to choose which frameworks to use in a given context below:
y For anomaly detection tasks in which the user is interested in determining how the
anomaly affects the frequency of the events, and the data the user has is unlabeled,
the framework of Section 3.3 is the ideal choice. The framework of Section 3.3 is
lightweight and quickly provides a visualized situation of the application’s context
using the frequency distribution of the kernel events to compute the similarity between
observations.
y If the user wants to target attacks that affect the frequency, order, and the execution
time of the events of these processes and the data is unlabeled, then the framework
of Section 3.5 is the only choice since it is designed for detect anomalies that affect
these properties of the kernel events.
y However, when deviations from the order of the event sequences are the only con-
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cern of the user, then the framework of Section 3.4 is the ideal choice if the data is
unlabeled.
y Finally, when the user has an imbalanced or balanced supervised multivariate data,
only the framework of Section 3.6 is designed to handle this kind of data and tasks.
Therefore, the choice of which of the frameworks should be employed is influenced by the
type of data (supervised or unsupervised), and the type of anomalous tasks (frequency,
order, execution time, or a combination of all). However, any of the other frameworks can
be used to annotate unlabeled data before using the data to train the framework of Section
3.6 if the user wants to take advantage of the features of this framework but has no labeled
data. The anomaly detection frameworks of Section 3.3, Section 3.4, and Section 3.5 are
designed for application to sequential data in any domain while the anomaly framework of
Section 3.6 is designed for non-sequential data.
5.9 Summary
This chapter discusses the results of the various experiments we conducted to verify the
performance of our contributions in this thesis. We also compare the results of our anomaly
frameworks with other leading works and algorithms in this domain. The comparisons con-
firm our hypothesis that our contributions in this thesis improve the detection of anomalies
in processes with higher accuracy and lower false positives.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Works
6.1 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, several unsupervised and supervised anomaly detection frameworks for anomaly
monitoring in an application have been introduced. We show that the kernel-level events
of an application can be used to decipher the behavior of a software application. Firstly,
we introduce an anomaly detection framework that uses the quantitative variance of the
kernel-level events of the process to characterize the traces in an application. Then, the
dendrogrammatic distance serves as a measure of detecting the deviating contexts. While
this anomaly detection framework shows impressive results in the benchmark datasets used
to validate the performance, this framework does not consider the traces’ temporal charac-
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teristics. Thereby failing to capture the inherent semantic structure of the process in the
modeling. This anomaly framework is suitable for online context modeling and anomaly
detection because of the length of the traces that it requires as input.
Secondly, to solve the limitations identified with the first anomaly detection framework,
we introduce a deep recursive attentive anomaly detection framework which uses LSTM-
based autoencoders with context-aware attention network to characterize the behavior of
an application via kernel-level event analysis. This anomaly detection framework features
online anomaly detection capability and deciphers the semantic structure of the process
behavior via sequential event analysis. A classifier built with KNN algorithm is attached
to the deep recursive attentive network to process the reconstruction errors and classify
a trace as malicious or benign. While this anomaly framework improves on the previous
framework, it lacks quantitative analysis capability, and cannot detect anomalies due to the
distribution of the kernel-level events. Furthermore, this anomaly detection cannot take
advantage of other features of the kernel-level events that can help broaden the scope of
anomalies that it can detect in the system. For example, it cannot process the execution
time and system call argument properties of the kernel-level events. The KNN classifier also
became a weakness because we have to create a balance between the number of samples we
use to build the KNN, and the accuracy of the model since the model stores the data.
Thirdly, considering the limitations identified in the second anomaly detection framework,
we introduce an ensemble deep recursive attentive anomaly detection framework that solves
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the limitations of all the previously introduced anomaly detection frameworks. It takes the
order, frequency, and execution time time properties of the kernel-level events into account
in the characterization of the application. Also, we use a piece-wise probability function
to perform the anomaly detection instead of using an algorithm like KNN, in which the
performance varies with the sample size of the data used in building the model. This
design produced an anomaly detection section that is lightweight. One of our greatest
challenge at this stage was the lack of data that captures in great detail, these properties
that this anomaly detection framework considers. Therefore, we built a UAV application
and logged the data, which we use to validate this anomaly detection framework. This
dataset has since been made available to the research community so that others would
not have to reinvent the wheel. However, we have described all these frameworks so far
using reconstruction errors and clustering, which is the hallmark of unsupervised learning.
Therefore, given labeled data, these anomaly frameworks cannot take advantage of the
availability of labels to build a more robust anomaly framework. The ensemble framework
results in an anomaly framework with lots of parameters, thereby requiring a system with
huge computational resources to run the anomaly detection framework. Furthermore, since
these anomaly detection frameworks described so far, all use a closed-world approach of
modeling, data class imbalance, which affects the effectiveness of the supervised anomaly
detection model, is not considered.
Fourthly, we introduce a supervised multi-stage CGAN-derived anomaly detection frame-
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work for supervised learning-based context modeling and anomaly detection. The CGAN
is used to handle data class imbalance and model the characterization of the application.
While an embedding algorithm, along with a probability-based algorithm, is used to perform
anomaly detection. Unlike most anomaly detection frameworks, this CGAN-based anomaly
detection framework cleverly avoids passing the test data through the core of the anomaly
framework, thereby removing the influence of noisy data on the effectiveness of the anomaly
framework. With the arrival of ubicomp, these anomaly detection frameworks are expected
to run everywhere and in any device, thereby presenting the challenge of scalability.
To solve the challenge of scalability of the anomaly detection frameworks, we introduce a
distributed algorithm that enables the nodes in edge network to take advantage of the diverse
computational capacity of the heterogeneous nodes in the system. This network algorithm
empowers nodes to efficiently distribute anomaly detection tasks, thereby increasing the
throughput of the anomaly detection frameworks. We hypothesize that these devices have
different behaviors and varying compute capacity. Therefore, the nodes can exploit the
excess resource in the same edge node to increase the number of processes it can monitor
and correspondingly, scale the number of anomaly tasks it can process.
In all the works described above, our experimental results confirm our hypothesis as we
achieved results that beat benchmark frameworks that use similar data for validation.
Through a careful, systematic approach, we can identify limitations at each stage and
introduce a new contribution that solves that challenge.
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6.2 Future Directions
Based on some limitations observed in this thesis, we will be pursuing future research in
the following areas:
y The complexity of the ensemble anomaly detection framework increases inference
time in low-capacity devices, and investigating how to develop a lighter version of the
structure without impacting the efficacy of the framework negatively forms part of
our future work.
y In the distribution algorithm, the random scenarios’ anomaly tasks have no improve-
ment when we distribute the tasks. Therefore, developing a more robust algorithm
that considers load prediction while balancing anomaly tasks is part of our future
research directions.
y Also, the domain of the proposed AD-CGAN framework can be improved upon to
include text and audio signals processing to combat the spread of fake news in social
media and detect fraud due to synthesized audio signals.
y To produce more interpretable anomaly detection frameworks at the kernel layer, we
will incorporate some source code domain knowledge from the application layer to
provide an explainable insight to the cause of any anomaly that we detect. This area
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of research will help in designing efficient impact mitigation steps for the system when
we identify an anomaly.
180
References
[1] Marjia Akter, Gowrab Das Dip, Moumita Sharmin Mira, Md Abdul Hamid, and
MF Mridha. Construing attacks of internet of things (iot) and a prehensile intrusion
detection system for anomaly detection using deep learning approach. In International
Conference on Innovative Computing and Communications, pages 427–438. Springer,
2020.
[2] Omar Ahmed Al-Motwakel and Ammar Thabit Zahary. Ubiquitous computing and
its security concerns. In 2019 First International Conference of Intelligent Computing
and Engineering (ICOICE), pages 1–16, 2019. IEEE.
[3] Paul D Allison. Missing data: Quantitative applications in the social sciences. British
Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 55(1):193–196, 2002. Wiley Online
Library.
[4] Riyaz Ahamed Ariyaluran Habeeb, Fariza Nasaruddin, Abdullah Gani, Mo-
hamed Ahzam Amanullah, Ibrahim Abaker Targio Hashem, Ejaz Ahmed, and Muham-
181
mad Imran. Clustering-based real-time anomaly detection: A breakthrough in big data
technologies. Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies, 23(1):3647–
3673, 2019.
[5] Josep Balasch, Benedikt Gierlichs, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. An in-depth and black-
box characterization of the effects of clock glitches on 8-bit mcus. In 2011 Workshop
on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography, pages 105–114. IEEE, 2011.
[6] Ron Bell. Introduction to iec 61508. In Proceedings of the 10th Australian workshop
on Safety critical systems and software, volume 55.
[7] Armin Biere, Alessandro Cimatti, Edmund Clarke, and Yunshan Zhu. Symbolic model
checking without bdds. In International conference on tools and algorithms for the
construction and analysis of systems, pages 193–207. Springer, 1999.
[8] Guilherme O Campos, Arthur Zimek, Jörg Sander, Ricardo JGB Campello, Barbora
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